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Abstract
Safety-critical Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) require real-time machine learning for
control and decision making. One promising solution is to use deep learning to discover
useful patterns for event detection from heterogeneous data. However, deep learning
algorithms encounter challenges in CPS with assurability requirements: 1) Decision explainability, 2) Real-time and quickest event detection, and 3)Time-efficient incremental
learning.
To address these obstacles, I developed a real-time Machine Learning Framework for
Quickest Detection (MLQD). To be specific, I first propose the zero-bias neural network, which removes decision bias and preferabilities from regular neural networks and
provides an interpretable decision process. Second, I discover the latent space characteristic of the zero-bias neural network and the method to mathematically convert a
Deep Neural Network (DNN) classifier into a performance-assured binary abnormality
detector. In this way, I can seamlessly integrate the deep neural networks’ data processing capability with Quickest Detection (QD) and provide real-time sequential event
detection paradigm. Thirdly, after discovering that a critical factor that impedes the
incremental learning of neural networks is the concept interference (confusion) in latent space, and I prove that to minimize interference, the concept representation vectors
(class fingerprints) within the latent space need to be organized orthogonally and I invent
a new incremental learning strategy using the findings, I facilitate deep neural networks
in the CPS to evolve efficiently without retraining. All my algorithms are evaluated
on real-world applications, ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcasting)
signal identification, and spoofing detection in the aviation communication system. Finally, I discuss the current trends in MLQD and conclude this dissertation by presenting
the future research directions and applications.
As a summary, the innovations of this dissertation are as follows: i) I propose the zerobias neural network, which provides transparent latent space characteristics, I apply
it to solve the wireless device identification problem. ii) I discover and prove the orthogonal memory organization mechanism in artificial neural networks and apply this
mechanism in time-efficient incremental learning. iii) I discover and methamtically prove
the converging point theorem, with which we can predict the latent space topological
characteristics and estimate the topological maturity of neural networks. iv) I bridge
the gap between machine learning and quickest detection with assurable performance.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

In this chapter, I will first introduce the motivation of my research: the obstacles that
deep learning is facing when they are applied in safety-critical and latency-constrained
CPS. I will then introduce the solution briefly. Finally, I will highlight the significance
and contribution of the research.

1.1

Background and Motivation

A Learning-enabled CPS (LE-CPS) is defined as a cyber-physical system composed
of one or more Learning-enabled Components (LECs). A LEC is a component whose
behavior is driven by “background knowledge” acquired and updated through a “learning
process”. A promising solution to implement LECs is Deep Learning (DL), particularly,
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), in which unified frameworks are provided to simplify
pattern recognition algorithms. For example, in my previous work of detecting rogue
UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems), deep learning is employed to recognize the appearance
of drones by identifying their signals [2, 3].

1
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2

Deployment and broader proliferation of LE-CPS in safety-assured and latency-constrained
applications are still challenging and controversial. Several factors impede the deployment and adoption of DL:

• Explainability: Deep neural networks (DNNs) are essential building blocks for
LE-CPS. However, users have little knowledge of how a neural network can associate a certain input with a specific label and how a neural network behaves
when encountering an unseen novel input. In extreme cases, neural networks can
associate irrelevant inputs to known labels confidently.
• Performance assurability: The learning-enabled CPS should be able to respond
to known or unknown events with the lowest assurable latency. The system should
respond properly to unknown events and make decisions on known events with the
lowest latency.
• Evolvability: Conventional deep neural networks encounter catastrophic forgetting when they are trained for new tasks. It is inefficient to retain old training
samples during the life cycle of CPS. Learning-enabled CPS are supposed to be
evolving in a controllable manner to adapt to operational variations.

Therefore, to deploy deep learning algorithms to safety-critical CPS, there is a need to
develop an enhanced framework integrating real-time machine learning with quickest
detection. Simultaneously, there is another need to enhance the dependability and
adaptability of deep learning algorithms, particularly deep neural networks.

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.2

3

Proposed Methodology

In this dissertation, I will develop a holistic framework for LE-CPS in safety-critical and
latency-constrained applications. Specifically, my works are divided into three parts: a)
Enhancement of deep neural networks for explainability and abnormality detection. b)
Quickest detection for deep neural networks. c) A time-efficient incremental learning
algorithm for evolving CPS.
First, I thoroughly analyze the mathematical process of dense layers in deep neural networks. I discover that the last dense layer is only a biased single kernel nearest neighbor
matching process using cosine similarity. Accordingly, I design the zero-bias dense layer
to replace the last dense layers (classification dense layer) in deep neural networks to
increase their explainability. I have applied this improvement of deep neural network for
physical layer emitter identification in ADS-B systems. My solution maintains equivalent accuracy and surpasses existing solutions in terms of automated anomaly detection
and incremental learning.
Second, I discover that deep neural networks can use the maximum confidence value
to assign known and abnormal inputs to two different probability distributions. This
phenomenon not only provides the potential to design an anomaly detector but also
provides the chance to incorporate deep learning algorithms with the quickest event
detection theory. I analyze the latent space characteristics of neural networks and find
that the response characteristics of neural networks can be modeled by two Bernoulli
distributions. I propose to leverage parametric event detection with the CUSUM (cumulative sum control chart) enabled gernalized likelihood ratio test algorithm to detect
the emerging point with the shortest delay under given false alarm constraints.
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Third, deep neural networks in safety-critical CPS may be subject to the situation of
life-long learning. They should be capable of incremental learning new labeled data
without forgetting. Existing methodologies use knowledge replay, network expansion,
or critical connection protection to prevent catastrophic forgetting. However, knowledge
replay may not be feasible since I can not retain generative models for all old data. Furthermore, the critical connection protection strategy encounters numerical instability
for regularized training. To solve the problem, I discovered and mathematically prove
that organizing concept representation vectors in the latent space in a mutually orthogonal manner, is an optimal way that minimizes mutual interference. And the essence of
catastrophic forgetting is concept confusion or interference. I then invented a novel incremental learning algorithm, Channel Separation Incremental Learning (CSIL), which
allows neural networks to organize concepts in different stages orthogonally.

1.3

Significance

Deep learning has been employed as an important building block of learning-enabled
CPS. Other researches focus merely on accuracy. My research focuses on how to enable
deep learning in safety-critical and performance-assured CPS. My highlights are in three
folds: First, my work explicitly explores the mathematic essence and the techniques on
how to prevent deep neural networks from making risky decisions. Second, I enable deep
learning to be used in performance-assured CPS for real-time event detection, I provide a
novel method to seamlessly bridge quickest event detection with Deep Learning. Third, I
discover and mathematically prove that organizing concept representation vectors in the
latent space mutually orthogonal is an optimal way that minimizes mutual interference.
Finally, based on the discovery of orthogonal memory representation, I design a novel

Chapter 1. Introduction

5

incremental learning algorithm, Channel Separation Incremental Learning (CSIL), which
beats the existing incremental learning algorithms with or without historical rehearsal
data.

1.4

Organization of the Dissertation

Finally, the remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows: In chapter 2, I will
give a comprehensive review of the enabling technologies of event detection in CPS. And
then, Chapter 3 will introduce a novel machine learning for quickest detection framework
with all theoretical findings in this dissertation. Next, the zero-bias neural network
with its internal mechanisms will be discussed in Chapter 4. After that, I will present
my findings on the mathematical mechanisms of catastrophic forgetting and discuss the
time-efficient channel separation incremental learning algorithm in Chapter 5. Moreover,
the zero-bias neural network enabled quickest event detection algorithm will be discussed
in Chapter 6. Finally, a conclusion of the dissertation and a discussion of the future
directions will be presented in Chapter 7.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Deep learning has been utilized in LE-CPS. However, as in other domains, it encounters
several problems, such as dependability, interpretatability, incremental learning, and
quickest event detection. Researches in CPS rarely cover these problems and they are
becoming emerging issues in the proliferation of learning-based systems.

2.1

Abnormality detection for neural networks

One critical problem for learning is that neural classifiers only recognize pre-trained
objects but can erroneously associate irrelevant objects with existing labels. From the
perspective of Artificial Intelligence (AI), this issue is categorized as the Open Set Recognition or Abnormality Detection problem [4, 5]. The Abnormality Detection problem
and the taxonomy of existing approaches are given in Table 2.1.

6
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Table 2.1: Methods for open set recognition
Methods

Description

Pros & Cons

Reference

GAN

Use the discriminator from GAN model as
an outlier detector.

High1

Depends on final
network

• Can catch deep latent features.
• Hard to design and train.

[6, 7]

Autoencoder

Train a deep Autoencoder on known signals
and use its reconstruction error to judge
outliers.

High1

Depends on final
network

• Can catch deep latent features.
• Easier than GAN to design
and train

[8, 9]

Statistic

Measure the possibility of whether a signal
or its fingerprint is generated by a given
distribution (form by known transmitters)

Low

Low

• Provide explainable results.
• Accuracy depends on the
fingerprinting methods.

[10–12]

Clustering

Perform clustering analysis on known signals’
fingerprints to judge whether it is in identical
cluster as known ones.

Depends on the
number of existing
fingerprints.

• Provide explainable results
• Accuracy depends on the
fingerprinting methods.

[10, 13]

1 Needs

Complexity

Median2

to specify both network architecture and hyperparameters.

2.1.1

Memory

2 Needs

to specify clustering algorithms to use.

Statistical Modeling

Statistical modeling approaches aim to judge whether a specific device is operating
under an abnormal situation. In [14], a Markov chain based transition model of the
devices’ state machine was utilized to judge whether an IEEE 802.11 device is compromised by calculating the probability of its sequential transition of the protocol state
machine. In [15], the authors modeled the Electronic Magnetic (EM) harmonics peaks
of medical CPS devices as probabilistic distributions to assess whether a specific device
is under attack. They assumed that when devices are operated under an abnormal scenario (with the rogue shellcode executing), its EM radiometric signals can deviate from
known scenarios. However, statistical modeling requires manual selection of potentially
informative features and ranking their importance.
When it is in the Deep Neural Network, the response of a network can be utilized for
anomaly detection. To exploit the feature mapping function of neural networks, in [13],
the authors formulated it as a semisupervised learning problem. They first trained a
CNN model with the last layer as a Softmax function on a collection of known data,
and then they removed the Softmax and turned the neural network into a nonlinear
feature mapper. Finally, they used cluster analysis on the remapped features. Their
results show that such a semisupervised learning method has the potential of detecting
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untrained emitters, but their methods are still far from mature. In [10], the authors
provide two methods to deal with unknown inputs: i) Reuse trained convolutional layers
to transform inputs to feature vectors and then use Mahalanobis distance to judge the
outliers. ii) Reuse the trained convolutional layers and then perform k-means (k = 2)
clustering to group outliers. In [16] and [17], the data traffic attributes were obtained
from flow-level network telemetry to recognize different IoT devices. The authors utilized
Principle Component Analysis along with an adaptive one-class clustering algorithm to
find the optimal representative components and cluster centers for each device. They
show that their method can even detect devices that are hijacked and with abnormal
communication behaviors.
Using neural network for abnormality detection is an emerging topic, some state-of-art
approaches require more complicated reconstruction approaches such as GAN (Generative Adverserial Network) and Autoencoders.

2.1.2

Reconstruction Approaches

Reconstruction approaches aim to discover domain-specific patterns from devices’ normal operation records. In my scope, this means that there is a need to develop a learning
agent to ”overfit” the normal schemes of IoT devices by producing low reconstruction
errors, at the same time, I hope that the learning agent produces high reconstruction
error for unknown scenarios.
This goal is generally achieved using deep autoencoders. Technically, a deep autoencoder
is composed of two sequentially connected neural networks, the first network (a.k.a.
encoder) maps high dimension input data to a low dimension space. In contrast, the
second network (a.k.a. decoder) aims to reconstruct the original inputs from the low
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dimension representation. Since a great amount of useful information is removed by the
encoder, the decoder needs to reconstruct the lost information according to its domainspecific ’knowledge.’ As a consequence, once abnormal inputs are given to a well-trained
autoencoder, its decoder would not be able to reconstruct such unknown inputs and
output a high abnormal score (reconstruction error). In [18], the authors used 155
features of each packet to feed in stacked autoencoders trained on normal operational
data and use them for anomaly detection. Similar works are presented in [19, 20],
the authors utilized autoencoders to detect abnormal activities by analyzing the data
packets of wireless devices, once abnormal activities are detected (high reconstruction
error), another classifier was used to classify intrusions. In [21], the authors have shown
that compared with other anomaly detection methods (one-class SVM [22], Isolation
Forest [23] and Local Outlier Factor [24]), deep autoencoder yields the best result in
terms of reliability and accuracy.

2.1.3

Predictive Approaches

To use temporal information in devices’ operation records, prediction approaches model
the operational data of wireless devices as a multidimension time series, in which deviceoriented prediction models are trained using sequential records in normal schemes. It
is assumed that, when devices are hijacked for rogue activities, it will not behave as
predicted, and prediction errors will occur as alarms.
In [25], the authors employed a CNN based predictor to analyze the abnormal behaviors
of users’ cellular network usage records. They show that predictors trained without
abnormal data are sensitive to anomalies. Similar work is presented in [26], and the
authors used an autoregression model to capture the normal varying trend of devices’
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traffic volumes. However, modeling a single variable can not be sufficient in dealing with
complicated scenarios. Recent studies combine deep Autoencoders with Long-ShortTerm Memory (LSTM) to first derive an abstract representation of complex scenarios
and make predictions. In [27] and [28], Deep Predictive Coding Neural Network [29] was
used to predict consecutive frames of time-frequency video streams of wireless devices.
They methods can even specify the class of attacks using the spatial distribution of error
pixels in each frame.
A similar approach using Deep Learning is presented in [30]. The authors used TCP
data traffics for each device to train an LSTM-enabled autoencoder to map inputs into
a representative feature space. They then used a clustering algorithm to divide the
training samples into their natural clusters. Finally, they used probabilistic modeling to
associate new data with known clusters for device identification. Unfortunately, their
experiments showed that unsupervised behavior identification may not work once there
are devices of an identical model.
The aforementioned methods may not be generalized to nonlinear features. In [6], the
authors first used a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) to generate highly realistic
fake signals. Then they exploited the discriminator network to distinguish whether an
input is from an abnormal source. Similar methods are developed using autoencoders.
Autoencoders first encode input vectors into a sparse latent representative space and
then use trained domain-specific decoders to reconstruct the original inputs. When an
unseen novel input is fed into an autoencoder, the reconstruction is deemed to fail and
yields a high error score. However, both GAN and autoencoders introduce new black
boxes into processing chains and need special adaptation for real-time safety-critical
CPS.
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Idealistic model
from lab

Model in
deployment site
Transfer learning
Practical data

Before deployment
After deployment

Continual learning

Figure 2.1: Transfer learning versas incremental learning.

Abnormality detection would partially solve the problem of knowing the unknown, however, many approaches are computationally expensive and can not be applied in safetycritical CPS.

2.2

Incremental learning

In practical scenarios, DNNs would be continuously evolving to adapt to operational
variations. For example, a deep learning-enabled wireless device identifier has to learn
the characteristics of new devices during its life cycle. These functionalities are defined as lifelong learning in neurophysiological science. Generally, there are two ways to
achieve this goal: Transfer Learning (TL) and Incremental Learning (IL). In Transfer
Learning, neural networks are pretrained in the lab and then finetune for deployment
using practical data [31]. In incremental learning, neural networks are trained incrementally as new data come in progressively [32]. Compared with transfer learning,
incremental learning does not allow neural networks to forget what they have learned
in the early stages. The phenomenon in which a neural network forgets what it has
previously learned after training on new data is named catastrophic forgetting. Therefore, transfer learning is useful when deploying new systems, and incremental learning
is useful in regular software updates, as depicted in Figure 2.1.
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There are several strategies to implement incremental learning for deep neural networks:

• Knowledge replay: The most intuitive solution for incremental learning is to
replay data from old tasks while training neural networks for new tasks. However,
such a solution requires longer training time and larger memory consumption. In
addition, one can not judge how many old samples are enough to catch sufficient
variation. Therefore, some studies employ a data generator network to replay
data from old tasks. For instance, in [33], Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)
based scholar networks were proposed to generate fake samples and mix them with
the current task. In this way, the deep neural network could be trained on various
data without using substantial memories.
• Regularization: Initially, regularization is to prevent models from overfitting by
limiting the magnitude of parameters [34]. In incremental learning, the effect of
regularization is to prevent the weights (parameters) of connections within neurons
from changing dramatically. In this way, the knowledge (parameters) learned from
the old tasks will be less likely to vanish when an existing network is trained on
new tasks. There are two types of regularization strategies: global regularization
and local regularization. Global regularization penalizes a network’s parameters
from rapid change, but it can eliminate the network from adapting to new tasks. In
local regularization strategies, such as Elastic Weight Consolidation (EWC) [35],
the algorithms identify important connections and protect them from changing
dramatically. Therefore, the neural network can use noncritical connections to
adapt to new tasks.
• Dynamic network expansion: Network expansion strategies lock the weights
of existing connections and supplement additional structures to learn new tasks.
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For instance, Dynamic Expanding Network (DEN) [36] algorithm first trains an
existing network on a new dataset with regularization. The algorithm compares
the weights of each neuron to identify task-relevant units. Finally, critical neurons
are duplicated to allow network capacity expansion.

Incremental learning algorithms, as well as anomaly detection are critical building blocks
for safety-critical CPS. Anomaly detection enables neural networks to know what they
do not know, while incremental learning significantly reduces the amount of time for
readapting to varying situations. A brief comparison of incremental learning strategies
is given in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Comparison of incremental learning strategies
Approaches

Highlights

Major drawbacks

Knowledge replay
w/o GAN-based data generator

Replaying old training data when
training for new tasks

Longer training time and
higher memory consumption.

Regularization

Preventing weights from changing
dramatically.

Regularization also prevents
learning new knowledge.

Dynamic expandable
network (DEN)

Expanding network structure to allow
learning new capacity.

Longer training time with
expanding memory consumption.

Elastic Weight
Consolidation (EWC)

Preventing critical weights from changing
dramatically.

Existing method suffers from
numerical stability.

2.3

Quickest Event Detection

Real-time event detection is a critical function in safety-critical CPS. I briefly categorize
the approaches for event detection in Figure 2.2. From the perspective of input data,
I categorize them into single-shot and sequential detection paradigms. In single-shot
detection, event detections are performed per observation (data batch), and the passed
data will not be retained for future use. In contrast, the sequential detection paradigm
allows accumulating information from past observations. Detecting unknown events is
also categorized as anomaly detection. In this dissertation, I focus on real-time sequential
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detection of events, and especially on how to integrate quickest detection theory with
deep learning to provide a performance-assured solution to latency-constrained CPS.
Known events

Supervised learning
(DNN, SVM and etc.)

Unknown events

Unsupervised learning
or statistical modeling

Single-shot

Event
detection

Anomaly
detection
Unknown events

Non-parametric change
detection

Known events

Supervised learning
(RNN, LSTM and etc.)

Sequential

Parametric change
detection

Figure 2.2: Categorization of event detection approaches.

From the perspective of a stochastic process, a system in different states can be described
by distributions with measurable statistical properties. And therefore, transitions within
states cause the change of those properties. My target is to detect the changes of
statistical properties of a stochastic system and time series with the lowest expected
latency. Quickest detection aims to detect the change as quickly as possible, subject to
false alarm constraints. The process is in essence an optimization problem formalized
by Pollak [37]:

min sup Ev [τ − v|τ ≥ v]
τ

(2.1)

v≥1

subj. to E∞ [τ ] ≥ β

(2.2)

where τ is the moment that a change happens at v is detected. Ev [τ − v|τ ≥ v] denotes
the expectation of detection latency. E∞ [τ ] denotes the mean time between false alarms.
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Rough estimation on
the change moment

Bayesian change
detection

Multi-Cyclic Shiryaev-Roberts

procedure
Single threshold
Change equal likely to
occur at any time

Stationary

Dual thresholds

Page's CuSum
algorithm

Sequential
probability ratio test

Optimize upper bounds of average
detection delays in terms of given
false alar m r ate and prior
knowledge of abruption moments
Optimize upper bounds of average
detection delays in terms of given
acceptable length of time between
false alar ms
Provides certain constraints and
relationship on average run length,
false alar m r ate and detection r ate

Figure 2.3: Categories of quickest detection on known post-change distribution.

Some research employs another form by Lorden [38]:

min sup ess supEv [τ − v|τ ≥ v]
τ

(2.3)

v≥1

subj. to E∞ [τ ] ≥ β

(2.4)

Compared with Pollak’s formation in (2.1), Lorden’s formation minimizes the worst-case
detection delay. The approaches for quickest event detection can be categorized into two
branches: a) detecting events with known postchange distributions. b) detecting events
with unknown postchange distributions. Generally, detecting known events is faster
than detecting unknown events. The scenarios for known event detection methods can
be summarized in Figure 2.3. A general workflow with known event distribution is as
follows:

Step 1: Choose two statistical models for pre-change (D0 ) and the changed (D1 ) observations.
Step 2: Select a metric L(D1 |D0 ) to compute the likelihood of current observation belonging to a changed distribution against the unchanged. Here, the hypothesis
is that L(D1 |D0 ) has a mean value of zero before happening of a detectable
event
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Step 3: Use a sequential cumulative or multiplicative process to accumulate the deviation of L(D1 |D0 ). With CUSUM algorithm we have:

Sn = max(Sn−1 , 1)L(D1 |D0 ), S0 = 0

(2.5)

With Shiryae-Roberts procedure, we have:

Rn = (Rn−1 + 1)L(D1 |D0 ), R0 = 0

(2.6)

Given the prior knowledge that the change moment follows a weighted geometry
distribution with parameter p and a weighting π at time zero, in Bayesian
change detection, we have:

Πn =

ϕn
1 + ϕn

(2.7)

ϕn =

1
π
L(D1 |D0 )(ϕn−1 + p), ϕ0 =
1−p
1−π

(2.8)

Step 4: Set a threshold ε according to the the constraints of false alarm, such as mean
time between false alarms of false alarm rate.

Please note that Bayesian change point detection algorithms provide a chance to integrate prior knowledge of abruption moments.
In some scenarios, a postchange distribution may not be known in advance and make it
difficult to calculate the likelihood ratio L(D1 |D0 ). The quickest detection algorithms
on the unknown postchange events distribution are summarized in Figure 2.4. Please
note that nonparametric strategies usually have higher latency and can not be computed recursively. There are generally two major nonparametric strategies to deal with
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uncertain postchange distributions:

Unknown distribution
on changed states

Replace loglikelihood with
computable score functions

Sequential ranking
based
Quantile-Quantile
difference

Predefine a series or range
of possible parameters

Known detection
strategy

Generalized
loglikelihood ratio

Figure 2.4: Quickest detection with the unknown post-change distribution.

• Earliest warning: A range of possible parameters for an upcoming change point
are defined and multiple detectors are executed simultaneously. The change is
assumed to be detected by the detector that gives a warning first.
• Numerical approximation: The essential idea is to measure the statistical deviations within samples. Quantile-Quantile difference and sequential ranking based
approaches are used to measure the deviation of samples in batch and then insert
the measured deviations into the classical sequential cumulative or multiplicative
processes.

Quickest detection provides a performance-assured solution to detect change points (related to events) in sequential data. However, the selection of statistic metrics still
depends on trial-and-error. And therefore, quickest event detection may not be a mature method to deal with complicated scenarios. It is of great significance to integrate
quickest detection theory with deep neural networks to form a quickest event detection
framework with automated statistical feature selection.

Chapter 3

Machine Learning for Quickest
Event Detection: A Novel
Framework

In this chapter, the Machine Learning for Quickest Detection (MLQD) framework will
be introduced. I aim to give a big picture of the related technologies and findings in this
dissertation. This framework can be generalized to other conventional ML applications.

Initial
training

Regional Association Property
Single-shot detection of known
events

Zero-bias neural
network

Quickest abnormal event
detection with application in
identity spoofing detection

Single-shot detection of unknown
events
Interference minimization
characteristics of class
fingerprints

Channel Separation Enabled
Incremental Learning

Time efficient incremental
learning

Figure 3.1: Theoretic framework of machine learning for quickest detection
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A theoretic framework of machine learning for quickest detection is given in Figure 3.1
and the corresponding research and findings in this dissertation are given in Figure 3.2.
In this framework is highly dependent on the characteristics of the zero-bias neural
network. In essence, the zero-bias neural network provides a ladder for us to explore
the topological characteristics of the latent space of neural networks. The zero-bias
neural network also provides better performance on abnormality detection. Therefore,
I can directly build the single-shot known event detector and the single-shot abnormal
event detector. However, single-shot detectors can make mistakes, thereby causing miss
detection or false alarms. One way to eliminate false alarms is to use a sliding window
to accumulate warning signals and assure the real event. However, configuring the
length of the sliding window will be another difficult task. In this dissertation, I use the
Bernoulli Generalized Likelihood Ratio test algorithm to process the warning signals.
The target here is to detect unknown events under certain false positive constraints
with the minimum latency. Different from others, I do not simply feed the results from
single-shot detectors into sequential event detectors (usually constructed by CUSUM
algorithm) as in other nonparametric approaches. I explicitly explore the latent space
of neural networks and propose a new way and make it possible to use parametric
approaches for sequential event detection.
As the learning components in the CPS are to be dynamically evolve to adapt to operational variations, I also invented a channel separation enabled incremental learning strategy for time-efficient learning of neural networks. Different from existing approaches, I
explicitly explore the root cause of catastrophic forgetting from the perspective of latent
space and have provided some new insights on how to design more reliable incremental
learning algorithms.
I validated the proposed framework using real ADS-B signals. I use two application
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Zero-bias Neural Network
Zero-bias dense layer

Latent space characteristics

Transparent decision process

Abnormality detection
(knowing the unknown)

Voronoi diagram

Error tendency analysis

Converging point theorem

Single-shot wireless device identification
and identity spoofing detection

Quickest event detection:
A semi-supervised learning approach
Regional Association property

Early warning generator
Time Efficient Incremental Learning

Sequential binary abnormality detector with
performance boundaries (TPR/FPR)

Detectability criterias

Bernoulli distributions

Bernoulli general likelihood ratio test
approximated by CUSUM algorithm

Topological maturity metric
(Degree of Conflicts)

A new explanation of
catastrophic forgetting

Quickest identity spoofing detection

Orthogonal Memory Organization
minimizes interference with proof

Channel Separation
Incremental Learning

Figure 3.2: Related research in this dissertation

cases to demonstrate the effect of my proposed framework: a) Incremental learning
enabled reliable non-cryptographic device identification. b) Quickest Identity Spoofing
Detection for ADS-B system.

3.1

Zero-bias Neural Network

Zero-bias neural network is the most important building block of MLQD. Specifically,
I invented the zero-bias dense layer to replace the final decision layer (usually the last
dense layer before the softmax function) of regular neural networks. In regular scenarios,
the decisions are made through biased and weighted cosine similarity matching. In the
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zero-bias dense layer, I remove bias neurons and equalize the weights. And therefore, I
make it a fair decision process using cosine similarity as in Equation (4.8). Noted that
cosine similarity can be visualized using the unit hypersphere as in Figure 6.1 or using
Voronoi diagram in Figure 6.2. In this section, I only highlight several key features of
zero-bias neural networks that support the remaining findings.

1. Regional Association Characteristic: I visualize the decision boundaries of
zero-bias neural network and derive Remark 6.1, 6.3, and 6.5. These remarks
provides a novel solution to turn a well trained zero-bias neural network into a
performance assured binary abnormality detector.
2. Optimal separation of class representation vectors in the latent space:
I discover and prove that the class representation vectors (class fingerprints) in
the latent space will distribute following a minimal interference manner as in
Theorem 5.1. 5.6, and 5.5. Using these theorems I analyze the root cause of
catastrophic forgetting and invented my Channel Separation Incremental Learning (CSIL) Strategy. CSIL enables zero-bias neural network to evolve and adapt
to operational variations without needing retrain from scratch.

3.2

Deep Learning Enabled Quickest Event Detection

In this dissertation, I first use initial training to derive a zero-bias neural network for
event detection. In which, the event detector is capable of detecting some unknown
events and incrementally learning new events. The event detection scene of MLQD can
be categorized into two parts:
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1. Single-shot event detection: in this case, the specific type of event has already
been learned by the zero bias neural network event detector reliably. In this case,
I don’t need to apply sequential event detection strategy.
2. Sequential event detection: When there’s interference as in the signal intelligence and spectrum sensing applications, sequential event detection strategy is
needed. The merit of sequential event detection is that it gradually accumulate
evidence and eliminate false alarms. One typical way is to use CUSUM algorithm
to process the output of the event detector, CUSUM algorithm has been proved to
have the minimum detection delay (quickest detection). However, before this dissertation, there’s still no way to connect CUSUM algorithm with neural network
within a performance assured way.

3.3

Time Efficient Incremental Learning

Neural networks in CPS or IoT (Internet of Things) are supposed to evolve to adapt to
operational variations during their life-cycle. However, learning new concepts without
forgetting the existing ones is never easy. I use zero-bias neural network to explore
the mathematical essence of catastrophic forgetting and derived my own incremental
learning strategy. This part of work provides insights into the latent space characteristics
of deep neural networks.

Chapter 4

Zero-Bias Deep Learning with
Application in Wireless Device
Identification

In this chapter, I propose an enhanced deep learning framework for accurate and interpretable identification of IoT devices with mathematically assured performance. I
propose a zero-bias dense layer for Deep Neural Networks to jointly verify known devices
and identify unknown ones. The effectiveness of the proposed framework in handling
massive signal recognition and improving the performance of traditional neural networks
has been demonstrated.
My research offers not only a new paradigm in DNNs, thus useful in promoting trustworthy IoT, but also a deep learning framework for intrusion detection. In addition, the
introduction of zero-bias layer in deep neural networks represents an advance in deep
learning, thus leveraging deep learning to enable the move from IoT to real-time control.
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Zero-bias Dense Layer for Deep Learning

This section will provide a thorough analysis of the mechanism of dense layers in regular
neural networks and introduce the zero-bias layer to replace the decision layer (the last
dense layer) of DNNs. The framework is capable of reporting unseen patterns to increase
dependability and explainability.

4.1.1

Formalization of Zero-bias Neural Network

A typical architecture of the deep learning model is given in Figure 4.1. Generally, the
input data are processed with several convolution layers to extract latent information,
then several dense layers are used to remove the redundancy and derive the final result.
The last dense layer (the decision layer) is considered to have the potential for various
applications, especially for transfer learning [39–41].
Input

Input

Convolution
layer

Convolution
layer

Fully-connected
layer

Results
Filters

Filters

Figure 4.1: Typical architecture of deep neural network

Start from the last dense layer, suppose that I have m-dimension input vectors with
batch size k, the layer needs to convert the input into k n-dimension output vectors. A
linear calculation on the input is conducted as:

Y1 = W1 X + b1

(4.1)

where X denotes the input data, which is a m by k matrix. W1 denotes the weights,
which is an n by m matrix. Finally, b1 denotes an n-dimension bias vector. I break the
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regular dense layer into two consecutive parts, depicted in Figure 4.2, a regular dense
layer denoted by L1 and a dense layer without bias L2 , respectively. Then, the function
applied to the input data becomes:

Y2 = W2 Y1 = W2 W1 X + W2 b1

(4.2)

where W1 and b1 belong to L1 while W2 belongs to L2 . Note that Equations (4.2) and
(4.1) are performing equivalent transforms to X and should not degrade the network
performance. Therefore, I get my first theorem:
Theorem 4.1 (Equivalent replacement of the last dense layer). I replace the last dense
layer of a neural network with a consecutive structure consisting of a regular dense layer
(L1 ) and a dense layer without bias (L2 ). And this modification is equivalent to the
original neural network.

Input

X

Intermediate
layers

The last
dense layer

L1

Intermediate
vectors

X

W1

Y2

Softmax
layer

Results

L2
Y1

W2

Outputs
Y2

b1

Activated by Relu function

Direct pass through

Figure 4.2: Data flow of zero-bias layer.

However, from a more systematic view, L1 performs a dimension transform (reduction
in most cases) of features from prior convolution layers. Moreover, in L2 , I can rewrite
the matrix calculation into vectors:

Y2 = [w21 , w22 , ..., w2n ]T [y11 , y12 , ..., y1k ]

(4.3)
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where w21 , ..., w2n are row vectors corresponding to n output classes; y11 , ..., y1k are
k column vectors corresponding to the batch size. Each column vector denotes latent
features, a.k.a. feature vector, of an input sample. For specific feature vector y1k , the
output of L2 is:

Y2 [y1k ] = [w21 · y1k , w22 · y1k , ..., w2n · y1k ]

(4.4)

where y1k and Y2 [y1k ] are feature vector and output vector, respectively. And the
Softmax layer picks up the position of the largest element in Y2 [y1k ] as classification
output. The process in equation (4.4) can be rewritten using the Cosine Similarity:

w2n · y1k = ||w2n || · ||y1k || · cos(w2n , y1k )

(4.5)

If w21 , ..., w2n is considered as fingerprints of classes 1 to n, the zero-bias dense layer
L2 actually calculates a linearly scaled version of cosine similarity among the inputs
against the fingerprints of target classes.
Moreover, I can safely generalize this discovery to explain the behavior of dense layers
in DNN:
Remark 4.2 (Property of dense layer). If the outputs of a decision layer (always the
last dense layer) represent the degrees of confidence of associating specific labels to
an input, then each confidence degree is a linear projection of cosine similarity to the
corresponding class-related fingerprint. Its value is jointly controlled by the magnitude
of the fingerprint, the input vector’s cosine similarity to the fingerprint, and the bias of
the corresponding class.
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Although the magnitude of an input feature vector ||y1k || seems to take effect as in Equation (4.5), but in the consecutive Softmax layer, the magnitude ||y1k || only contributes
to a common base number as in Equation (4.6):


exp ||y1k || · ||w2n || · cos(w2n , y1k )

Sof tmax(L2 ) = P
n exp ||y1k || · ||w2n || · cos(w2n , y1k )

(4.6)


where exp ||y1k || is the common base number and controls the steepness of the monotonic mapping curve.
Remark 4.3. Neural networks’ global preference (partiality): A neural network’s global
preference or partiality to specific classes is encoded in its last dense layer before Softmax,
and the partiality is jointly controlled by the magnitude of class-related fingerprint
vectors and the bias value of the corresponding class.

In my proposed paradigm of modified dense layer, I can derive more specific corollaries:
Corollary 4.4. Fingerprints’ magnitude:

If the variance of the magnitude of fin-

gerprint vectors is small, the layer L2 has less preference or partiality towards specific
classes.

Currently, there are two approaches to remove the unwanted effects of fingerprint vectors’
magnitudes:

1. I can use regularization to eliminate the variance of fingerprints. For example,
when it’s under L2 regularization, the weights of fingerprint vectors in a decision
layer will be with small magnitude, and thus have smaller variation on decision
weights;
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2. I can replace Equation (4.3) by Equation (4.7):

w2n
w21
Y2 = [ p 2 , ..., p 2 ]T [y11 , ..., y1k ]
w21
w2n

(4.7)

Moreover, I can eliminate the side effects of feature vectors’ magnitude at the same
time:

"

w21
w2n
Y2 = λ p 2 , ..., p 2
w21
w2n


y
y
 p 11 , ..., q 1k 
2
y11
y2

#T 

(4.8)

1k

where λ is a trainable scalar to provide the freedom of controlling the steepness
of the mapping curve. In this way, the magnitudes of fingerprints or even feature
vectors will not take effect anymore. Please note that Y2 is differentiable in these
two scenarios. Equation (4.8) in this context is the cosine similarity comparison.

The transformation from a regular dense to a zero-bias dense layer is summarized as
in Figure 4.3. Noted in the first three transformation stages, the zero-bias deep neural
network is mathematically equivalent to regular neural networks, while the forth stage
totally turns L1 into a dimensionality reduction layer. I actually replace the last dense
layer of a neural network with a consecutive structure consisting of a regular dense layer
(L1 ) and a single-kernel cosine similarity comparing layer (L2 ).
I notice that some researches directly employ Equation (4.8) as cosine similarity [42, 43]
in deep learning, I are different as: a) I provide a mathematically equivalent transform
by using another regular fully connected layer L1 . b) my experiments show that directly
applying cosine similarity without L1 dramatically increases the difficulty of training.
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Figure 4.3: Transformation from a regular dense layer to a zero-bias dense layer.

4.1.2

Zero-bias Neural Network for Abnormality Detection: A Threshold Based Approach

If the side effects of fingerprints’ magnitude can be neglected (using the cosine similarity
comparison), I have Corollaries 4.5 and 4.6:
Corollary 4.5 (Fingerprints’ mutual distances). Fingerprints in the zero bias dense
layer (L2 ) should have sufficiently small mutual cosine similarities.
Corollary 4.6 (Fingerprints’ relation to features). Each fingerprint acts as an angular
representative of the feature vectors of the corresponding classes but does not necessarily
contain the complete information of the specific input category.

A simplified example of Corollary 4.6 is given in Figure 4.4. Suppose that there are
three classes (A, B, and X) for a deep neural network to distinguish. The fingerprint
vector of each class only captures a rough angular representation (direction).
Using the properties of the zero-bias layer enabled neural network, I can utilize the
similarity values for anomaly detection. I assume that the maximum similarity scores
of known and abnormal (unknown) inputs are from two different distributions as in
Figure 4.5. According to (4.8), I have:
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Figure 4.4: Relation of fingerprint vectors and feature vectors.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of maximum similarity scores

Remark 4.7. The maximum similarities of known inputs would distribute close to
positive λ while the maximum confidences of abnormal inputs are smaller and would be
distributed relatively closer to negative λ.
Remark 4.8. If the maximum confidence value of an input vector is lower than a certain
threshold, this input is considered novel or is severely contaminated.

An example is in Figure 4.14 of Section 4.2.5.2, in which the zero-bias layer enables
deep neural networks to have perfectly projected known and abnormal inputs to two
different distributions. If the two distributions are distinctively separated and have small
overlapping areas, I can even use thresholds.

4.1.3

Error Tendency Analysis for Zero-bias Neural Network

A very charming benefit of zero-bias neural networks is that it provides an elegant
interface to evaluate how well different classes are mutually distinguishable.
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Different from regular neural networks, the final decisions of zero-bias neural networks
purely depend on similarity matching. Without the interference of weights and biases, I
can easily interpret and visualize the mutual relationship of fingerprints (classes) in the
latent space. I can construct a Fingerprint Distance (FD) matrix as:




 cos(w1 , w1 ) . . . cos(w1 , wn ) 




.
.
.


..
..
..
FD = 





cos(wn , w1 ) . . . cos(wn , wn )

(4.9)

This matrix can directly reflect how well different classes are separated in the latent
space. I replace the last dense layer with zero-bias dense layer (containing both L1 and
L2 ) in the MNIST example [44] and plot the FD matrices when the training accuracy
reaches 60.2% and 95.8%, respectively. As in Figure 4.6, I use the color to denote
the cosine similarity. Apparently, the fingerprints of classes in the latent space are more
distantly separated when the neural network is trained after more iterations (with higher
accuracy). Observing the matrix, digit 4 and digit 6 are more likely to get confused since
their fingerprints are with higher cosine similar.
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Figure 4.6: Fingerprint distance matrix of Minst example

Such a fingerprint distance matrix is visually analogue to a regular confusion matrix,
but they are mathematically different in the following ways: a) a confusion matrix
depends highly on the distribution and characteristics of the data while my method is
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data independent. b) the method can be used to analyze the latent space characteristics
of neural networks.

4.1.4

Incremental Learning for Zero-Bias Neural Network: A Direct
Approach

I propose an incremental learning scheme for both zero-bias DNN and conventional DNN
classifiers:
Remark 4.9 (Incremental learning using the zero-bias dense layer). To enable a neural
network to recognize a novel class, one only needs to insert its representative fingerprint
in the last dense layer and fine-tune the old fingerprints’ directions when necessary.

Remark 4.9 indicates that:

• For a specific novel class, as long as the previous layers have extracted sufficient
distinctive features, I do not need to retrain the previous layers.
• For new classes, I need to insert new fingerprints and then adjust the old fingerprints when necessary.

To adjust an old fingerprint, I need to identify which parameter (or dimension) is critical
to the classification accuracy. According to the Elastic Weight Consolidation (EWC)
[35], the Fisher Information Matrix is used to model the importance of parameters as:

FΩ = [

∂log(P (XCV |Ω)) ∂log(P (XCV |Ω)) T
][
]
∂Ω
∂Ω

P (XCV |Ω) ≈ YSof tmax (XCV |Ω)

(4.10)
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where YSof tmax (XCV |Ω) denotes the averaged outputs of Softmax layer on validation
set XCV given parameter set Ω, it approximates the posterior probability P (XCV |Ω).
FΩ denotes the Fisher informati matrix of the current task. In my experiment, I further apply an exponential function to the Fisher Information to increase the numerical
stability as:

FΩ := exp (FΩ )

(4.11)

Intuitively, the importance of a parameter is equivalent to the square of its gradient with
respect to the logarithm of Softmax output function, also known as the log-likelihood
function.
Knowing the importance of existing parameters, I can define an integral loss function
for incremental learning as:

F1 (Ω) =

λ1 X
[FΩ∗ · (Ω − Ω∗ )2 ]
2
i

L(Ω) = (L2 (Ω) + F1 (Ω)) · Gm

(4.12)

where F1 (Ω) denotes the Fisher Loss with respect to old tasks (a.k.a., task-1). Ω∗
denotes the loss function and model parameters on task-1. L2 (Ω) and Ω denote the
raw loss function on Task-2 and the new model parameters. λ1 denotes the importance
of task-1. Intuitively, this integral loss function additionally penalizes the change of
critical parameters. Gm is a mask matrix, in which the value of each element can only
be zero or one. These elements are one-to-one associated with the parameters of a neural
network to control which parameter is locked or unlocked.
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Given a neural network trained on Task-1 (DN N1 ), incremental learning on Task-2 is
performed as follows:

Step 1: Store all learnable parameters of DN N1 as Ω∗ and calculate their importance
matrix FΩ∗ .
Step 2: Generate the initial fingerprint of each new class by averaging their feature
vectors.
Step 3: Concatenate initial fingerprints into the last dense layer or zero-bias dense layer.
Step 4: Lock the weights of previous layers and calculate the importance of parameters
of old fingerprints. The importance of newly concatenated fingerprints is set to
zeros; thus, I could allow them to learn freely.
Step 5: Use loss function as in Equation (4.12) and a training set of Task-2 to perform
network training.

Notably, I do not need to retain old training data to learn a new task, and such a benefit
is critical for DNN models in practical scenarios.

4.2

Zero-bias Deep Neural Network for Wireless Device
Identification

4.2.1

Introduction

The Internet of Things (IoT) is characterized by the interconnection and interaction
of smart objects (objects or devices with embedded sensors, onboard data processing
capabilities, and means of communication) to provide applications and services that
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would otherwise not be possible [45]. The convergence of sensors, actuators, information,
and communication technologies in IoT produces massive amounts of data that need to
be sifted through to facilitate reasonably accurate decision-making and control [46].
Big data analytics has the potential to enable the move from IoT to real-time control
[47]. However, due to the open nature of IoT, IoT is subject to cybersecurity threats
[48, 49]. One typical cybersecurity threat is identity spoofing attacks, where an adversary
passively collects information and then mimics the identity of legitimate devices to send
fake information or conduct other malicious activities. Such attacks can be extremely
dangerous when appearing in critical infrastructures [50].
Conventional approaches to prevent identity spoofing attacks employ cryptographic algorithms to verify that a trusted source generates a message. However, the cryptographic
approaches depend on the secrecy of encryption keys and encounter challenges from the
open and heterogeneous ecosystems of IoT. For example, a number of commercially
successful IoT systems, which do not operate with cryptographic keys, require a large
investment to become cryptographically secure [51]. Therefore, there is a need for noncryptographic solutions to verify the identify of IoT devices, thus ensuring trustworthy
IoT.
Non-cryptographic IoT device identification is inspired by signal identification technology in speech and acoustic signal processing [3]. The assumption is that each signal
source modulates its unique features into propagated signals. Comparably, in noncryptographic IoT device identification, I assume that each wireless transmitter randomly picks up certain types of imperfectness (a.k.a radiometric fingerprint) during
their manufacture [52] and could be reflected in the demodulated signals. Existing
works on non-cryptographic device identification can be classified into two categories:
specific feature recognition and deep learning. Specific feature-based approaches focus
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on deriving distinctive features (a.k.a., transmitter fingerprints) from received signals
[53, 54] to recognize known devices. Deep learning based approaches do not require
knowing the devices’ radiometric characteristics and show even higher accuracy [55, 56].
However, the challenge of applying deep learning approaches for IoT device identification lies in two aspects: unseen device recognition and model interpretability. The first
challenge requires deep neural networks to report unseen devices rather than erroneously
associating them with known ones. The second challenge requires that the behaviors of
neural networks to be interpretable.
In this application, I use zero-bias deep neural network for accurate and interpretable
identification of IoT devices with mathematically assured performance. This application offers not only a solution to accurate identification of IoT devices, thus useful in
promoting trustworthy IoT, but also a deep learning framework for intrusion detection.
In addition, the introduction of zero-bias layer in deep neural networks represents an
advance in deep learning, thus leveraging deep learning to enable the move from IoT to
real-time control.

4.2.2

Related Work

Non-cryptographic device identification is emerging as a solution to the physical layer
security of IoT. Corresponding methods can be classified into two categories: specific
feature based and deep learning based.
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Specific feature-based approaches

The specific feature-based approaches require human efforts to discover distinctive features for device identification. The methods rely on the fact that there are various manufacturing imperfectnesses in wireless devices’ RF frontends. These imperfectnesses do
not degrade the communication quality but can be exploited to identify each transmitter uniquely. Those features are named Physical Unclonable Features (PUF) [57, 58]).
There are two categories of PUFs: error patterns and transient patterns.
In the error pattern approach, it is assumed that the statistical properties of the received
symbols’ noise could uniquely profile wireless devices. In [59], the authors show that the
phase error of Phase Lock Loop in transmitters can provide promising results even with
low Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR). In [60], the authors use the difference between received
signals and theoretical templates to construct error vectors. Error vectors’ statistics and
time-frequency features are combined as fingerprints for transmitter identification. In
[61], the authors employ the differential constellation trace figure (DCTF) to capture the
time-varying modulation error of Zigbee devices. They then develop their low-overhead
classifier to identify 54 Zigbee devices.
In the transient pattern approach, it is assumed that a malicious entity can not forge
the transient response characteristic of wireless transmitters[62]. Transient patterns are
commonly seen at the beginning and end of wireless packet transmission. In [63], nonlinear in-band distortion and spectral regrowth of the signals are utilized to distinguish the
masquerade emitter. In [64], the authors employ the transient energy spectrum of transmitters’ turn-on amplitude envelops to identify, and they show that frequency-domain
features outperform time-domain features.
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Feature-based approaches require efforts to manually extract features or high-order
statistics for different scenarios. Therefore, more effortless and versatile methods are
required.

4.2.2.2

Deep Learning for Wireless Transmitter Identification

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are frequently used as a general-purpose BlackBox for
pattern recognition. Naturally, they are applied to perform device-specific identification.
A typical DNN enabled wireless device identification system employs convolutional layers to extract latent features. Convolutional layers apply filters (a.k.a., kernels) to obtain
helpful information automatically. Such benefit reduces the hardship of manual feature
discovery. In [65], the authors provide a novel method that performs signal denoising
and emitter identification simultaneously using an autoencoder and a Convolution Neural Network (CNN). Their solution shows promising results even with low SNR. Similar
work in [66] employs stacked denoising auto-encoder and showed similar results. DNNs
perform well even on raw signals. In [67], the authors provide an optimized Deep Convolutional Neural Network to classify SDR-based emitters in 802.11AC channels, they
show that, even by using raw signals without feature engineering, CNN surpasses the
best performance of conventional statistical learning methods. In [68], neural networks
were trained on raw IQ samples using the open dataset1 from CorteXlab. Their works
also show similar results. Compared with the specific feature-based approach, deep neural networks dramatically reduce the requirement of domain knowledge and the quality
of fingerprints.
In general, DNNs are becoming a promising building block in non-cryptographic wireless device identification. DNNs encounter a challenge in terms of anomaly detection,
1

https://wiki.cortexlab.fr/doku.php?id=tx-id
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which requires that deep learning identification systems not only perform well on trained
objects but also can report unknown objects that it would make a wrong decision. Furthermore, for dependable machine learning in practical scenarios, I need to understand
how a neural network associates an input with a corresponding label. These two aspects
are rarely covered in signal identification, thus motivating my research.

4.2.3

Problem definition

In this research, I focus on deriving a protocol-agnostic solution to identify IoT devices
from physical layer signals. The reason is that the signal features directly correspond
to hardware components and reveal the identities of IoT devices.
I define that an IoT device i transmits specific message with corresponding baseband
signal mi (t). mi (t) is modulated into:

Mi (t) = Ci [mi (t)]

(4.13)

where Ci (x) denotes the frequency band processing chain. At receiver j, the received
signal becomes:
Rij (t) = Sij [Mi (t)]

(4.14)

where Sij denotes the effect of wireless channel between i and j. This function can
incorporate the effect of attenuation or additive noise. The demodulated signal is:

m̂i (t) = Sj−1 {Cj−1 [Rij (t)]}
= Sj−1 {Cj−1 [Sij [Ci [mi (t)]]]}

(4.15)
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where Cj−1 (x) and Sj−1 (x) are j‘s estimated reverse function of Ci (x) and Sij , respectively. The estimation can hardly be idealistic. Therefore, at the receiver side, j, the
effect of such discrepancies are reflected in m̂i (t) as:

m̂j (t) = ri (t) + δj (t)

(4.16)

where ri (t) is directly correlated with mi (t) while the residual, δj (t), is utilized to recognize a wireless device. As long as δj (t) is uncorrelated with messages mi (t), the
recognition algorithm is protocol-agnostic. Apparently, this is a classification problem,
to avoid the hardship of feature engineering, I use DNN and convert IoT device recognition problem into 3 subproblems:

1. Given message-related baseband signals from various wireless transmitters, how
to extract message-independent components to develop a classifier using DNNs?
2. How to enable my classifier to properly respond to unseen signals?
3. How can I evaluate the distinguisability between different devices?

4.2.4

Methodology

In this section, I first present the feature extraction methods and then introduce the
zero-bias deep learning framework for accurate and interpretable identification of IoT
devices.

4.2.4.1

Baseband demodulation

In this research, I use an independent Software-Defined Radio (SDR) receiver, denoted
as j 0 , to collect baseband signals from wireless transmitters, denoted as m̂j 0 (t). Given
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an input signal x, the quadrature demodulation function is defined as:

Cj−1
0 (x) = I(t) + i · Q(t)

(4.17)

= LP F [x · cos(ωc t + φ0 ) + i · x · sin(ωc t + φ0 )]

where I(t) and Q(t) are In-Phase and Quadrature components, respectively. ωc and φ0
are the center frequency and the phase offset of the receiver (j 0 ), respectively. i denotes
the imaginary part of the complex function. With Phase Lock Loop (PLL), ωc and φ0
are supposed to be sufficiently close to RF characteristics of device i. LP F denotes a
low-pass filter. Therefore, at j 0 , the demodulated baseband is:

m̂j 0 (t) = Cj−1
0 [Rij 0 (t)]

(4.18)

m̂j 0 (t) is complex-valued, and its instantaneous amplitude, phase and frequency are
||m̂j 0 (t)|| =

p
d∠m̂j 0 (t)
Q(t)
I 2 (t) + Q2 (t), ∠m̂j 0 (t) = tan−1 (
) and Ω̂j 0 (t) =
, respecI(t)
dt

tively.
Please note that discrepancies exist between m̂j (t) and m̂j 0 (t). Even if the wireless
channel effects at the receiver j and j 0 are different, I assume that an SDR receiver
could still capture the effect of each wireless device’s frequency band processing chain,
Ci (x), to recognize them.

4.2.4.2

Feature extraction

For protocol-agnostic device recognition, I need to remove message-correlated part ri (t)
from m̂j 0 (t). In this way, I ensure that my device recognition mechanism is protocolagnostic. In addition, I only use the first 1,024 samples of m̂j 0 (t).
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Suppose I have derived the numerical sequence of instan-

taneous metrics (amplitude, phase, or frequency), and the corresponding procedures are
as follows:

Step 1: I separate the sequence (denoted as sj 0 (n)) into several non-overlap segments,
with each segment’s duration less than one symbol duration.
Step 2: For each segment, I perform k-medoids algorithm on signals instantaneous
phase or amplitudes with k = 2. In essence, I use a clustering algorithm to associate numeric values to their closest medoids (representative values). Notably,
I could only expect one or two possible choices of amplitudes or phases.
Step 3: In each segment, I generate the pesudo-noise as:

nj 0 (n) = sj 0 (n) − mk [sj 0 (n)]

(4.19)

where mk denotes the medoid of sj 0 (n), I subtract rationale signals from the
demodulated baseband signals directly.

A brief comparison of related signals is in Figure 4.7. Medoids could be regarded as a
less noisy version of the demodulated baseband signals m̂j 0 (t).
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Figure 4.7: Noise extraction on typical signals.
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Figure 4.8: Correlation coefficients of pesudo noise/

The distribution of correlation coefficients (derived from 10,000 samples) of pseudonoise
against the corresponding baseband signals is depicted in Figure 4.8. The pseudo-noise
signals are weakly correlated with the original messages.

Frequency domain features: I subtract the Fourier Transforms of both complexvalued baseband signals m̂j 0 (t) and the reconstructed rationale baseband signals to extract the message uncorrelated residual components in the frequency domain, formulated
as:

δj (ω) = F F T [m̂j 0 (t)] − F F T [rj 0 (t)]

(4.20)

where rj 0 (t) is the reconstructed rational baseband signal. Please note that m̂j 0 (t) is
complex-valued (QPSK) while rj 0 (t) can be real-valued (2FSK, 2PSK, and etc.). I convert the residual components into a magnitude sequence (||δj (ω)||), namely, Mag.-Freq.
residuals, and a phase sequence (∠δj (ω)), namely Phase-Freq. residuals, respectively.

4.2.5

4.2.5.1

Validations

Validation I: Trainability of Zero-bias Neural Network

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), which functions with satellite
rather than radar technology to more accurately observe and track air traffic, is an
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application of safety-critical CPS in aviation. In this subsection, I evaluate the zero-bias
deep neural network on real ADS-B baseband signals.
In my data collection pipeline, depicted in Figure 4.9, I used a modified gr-adsb library
to decode ADS-B messages and store raw baseband digital signals. I collected the ADSB signal from 150 aircraft at Daytona Beach international airport (ICAO: DAB) for 24
hours (Jan 4th , 2020) with a Software-Defined Radio receiver (USRP B210). The receiver
is configured with a sample rate of 8 MHz. During this period, more than 30,000 ADS-B
messages are collected with geographical coordinates depicted in Figure 4.10.
ICAO ID

Software-defined
Radio receiver

Modified
Gr-ADS-B

Signal demodulation

Baseband processing

Raw signals
Data corpus

Figure 4.9: Collection of ADS-B signals for model validation.

Figure 4.10: Geographic distribution of aircraft transponders.

I use a DNN model depicted in Figure 4.11 to verify the identity of transmitters with
given raw baseband signals. The neural network employs a similar architecture as
ResNet[69]. I use convolution layers with skip connections to extract useful features
and use a modified dense layer followed by a softmax layer for final classification.
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Figure 4.11: Deep neural network architecture for wireless transmitter
identification.

A comparison of the training process of neural networks with the proposed zero-bias
layer and a regular dense layer on the same dataset is given in Figure 4.12. They
reach identical performance in terms of validation accuracy. However, the zero-bias
layer requires more training iterations, and its rising rate of accuracy is lower at the
beginning. To evaluate the deep learning model in terms of training data efficiency, I
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Figure 4.12: Comparison of training performance.

manually limit the number of samples of each transmitter in the training set and use
this specially ”reduced” training set to train the zero-bias DNN model. As depicted in
Figure 4.13, the model converges after 800 iterations (40 epochs) and the experiment
shows that I only need 200 samples to recognize each transmitter.

4.2.5.2

Validation II: Unknown device identification

A wireless device identification system needs to respond to unseen data. In conventional
neural networks, the classification layer only associates labels with the largest activation value from the last hidden layer. However, such behavior would result in wrong
answers given novel signals from unknown devices. In my research, I explore two ways
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Figure 4.13: Validation accuracy in terms of training data size for each transmitter.

to identify whether a signal is from an unseen novel device. Suppose that my neural
network converts input data X to feature vectors FX through intermediate layers, I
divide the discussion into two scenarios: Similarity thresholds and One-class Support
Vector Machine.
I randomly pick ADS-B signals from 30 aircraft to train the neural network and use
signals from the remaining 120 aircraft as unseen novel devices’ signals. This section
will compare the performance of my zero-bias layer, regular dense layer, and one-class
SVM.
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Figure 4.14: Performance of Threshold based anomaly detection in neural network
with zero-bias layer

Comparisons with threshold based methods: I employ a zero-bias layer (Equation
(4.8)) for final output. The probability distributions and decision thresholds are depicted
in Figure 4.14a and 4.14b, respectively. Figure 4.14a demonstrates that the similarities
of unknown signals are higher than unknown signals in most cases. Figure 4.14b shows
that I can select an optimum separation threshold to maximize the decision margin of
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Figure 4.15: Performance of Threshold based anomaly detection in conventional
neural network

the anomaly detection algorithm. In this research, I used the median value of similarity
score values of known signals minus its standard deviation as a decision threshold.
I train identical neural networks but with the zero-bias layer replaced by a regular dense
layer under the same criteria. However, the anomaly detection performances are much
worse, as depicted in Figure 4.15a and 4.15b, the similarity score distributions of the
regular dense layer with known and unknown data are severely overlapped. The decision
margin in this scenario is much smaller.
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Figure 4.16: Performance of anomaly detection using one-class support vector
machine

Comparisons with One-class Support Vector Machine: I use the feature vectors
of the training set to train a one-class SVM model and use the feature vectors of the
validation set and unseen signals to test the performance of one-class SVM. I collect the
prediction scores on both known signals and unknown signals with the results presented
in Figure 4.16a and 4.16b, respectively. The result indicates that the prediction score
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distribution of one-class SVM significantly differs from the previous cases in the following
aspects:

1. Prediction scores of signals from unseen devices only occupy a narrow area.
2. Scores of known devices occupy a much wider area (larger variance), which may
cause difficulty for choosing the right threshold.

I can conclude that the performance of the zero-bias layer enabled neural network in
anomaly detection is comparable with one-class SVM. However, in my experiment, the
one-class SVM model ultimately stores more than 5,000 support vectors, while the zerobias layer only stores low dimension fingerprints of known aircraft transponders. Therefore, I believe my solution is more adaptable for real-time machine learning.

4.2.5.3

Validation III: Incremental learning

To evaluate the zero-bias neural network for IL. I first filter out transponders with very
few records. According to the appearance probability of RF transponders (Figure 4.17),
I use 400 appearances as a threshold to separate my data set into two parts, namely task1 and task-2 respectively. I first train the neural network on task-1 and use incremental
learning mechanisms to let my network recognize wireless transmitters in task-2 without
forgetting task-1.

Figure 4.17: Transponders’ appearance frequency
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Comparison of incremental learning strategies:

I compare other incremental

learning strategies with my solution (locking prior layers while allowing EWC in the
last layer). The descriptions of all these approaches are given in Table 4.1. I aim
to compare the effect of EWC as well as other network knowledge protection methods.
Please note that during the incremental learning, L2 regularization factors for the regular
neural network and zero-bias neural networks are all set to 0 and 0.025, respectively. I
will discuss the effect of L2 regularization in Section 4.2.5.3. The results are given in
Table 4.1: Comparisons of approaches for incremental learning

Lock zero-bias
layer

Elastic Weight
Consolidation

Locked prior
layers

Global EWC

No

Globally

No

Only train new
Fingerprints

Lock old
fingerprints

No

Yes

Only protect old
Fingerprints

Lock old
fingerprints

Yes

No

Only use EWC in
the last layer

No

Only in the
last layer.

Yes

Approaches

Figure 4.18. I highlight several observations:

1. In Global EWC, catastrophic forgetting is not prevented. Besides, the zero-bias
layer retains far less knowledge from previous tasks.
1

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

New task
Old task
Global EWC

Only train new
fingerprints

(a) Zero-bias layer

Only protect old
fingerprints

Only use EWC in
the last layer

Validation accuracy

Validation accuracy

1

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

New task
Old task
Global EWC

Only train new
fingerprints

Only protect old
fingerprints

Only use EWC in
the last layer

(b) Regular dense layer

Figure 4.18: Performance comparison of zero-bias layer and regular dense layer for
incremental learning
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2. Only training new fingerprints and locking all old weights in the network can help
retain knowledge from previous tasks. This phenomenon indicates that the prior
layers have already extracted useful features for the final classification. Moreover,
the performance of the zero-using bias layer indicates that it would enable prior
neural network layers to discover better features. Please note that this scenario
also prevents the fine-tuning of existing fingerprints even if they are in sub-optimal
directions.
3. Only protecting old fingerprints does not seem to be helpful. The new task will
destroy all useful feature extractors in prior layers.
4. Applying EWC only in the last layer provides the most promising results. Notably,
the neural networks with the zero-bias layer still outperform regular neural networks. This fact explains that EWC tries to protect old fingerprints from changing
erroneously (forgetting) and enables fine-tuning.

Effects of regularization:

Regularization can prevent neural networks’ parameters

from varying dramatically during training. I perform incremental learning using L2 regularization factors: 0, 0.025, and 0.05, respectively. The results in Figure 4.19a indicates
that without L2 regularization, the neural networks’ performance on the old tasks can
degrade slightly. With a larger L2 factor, as in Figure 4.19b and 4.19c, the performance
on old tasks is better retained. However, larger L2 factors also worsen the performance
of incremental learning. As shown in Figure 4.19c, although the performance on the old
tasks is maintained, the accuracy of new tasks is bounded to 80%.
Similar experiments are conducted using regular dense layer with the results given in
Figures 4.19d, 4.19e and 4.19f, respectively. In my test case, when the L2 regularization
factor is zero, the neural network with regular dense layer gradually forgets what it
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(a) Zero-bias layer, L2=0
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(b) Zero-bias layer, L2=0.025
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(c) Zero-bias layer, L2=0.05

Figure 4.19: Effects of L2 regularization.

learns in task-1. Increasing the L2 regularization factor stops the forgetting trend, but
the performance of my proposed zero-bias layer is much better. It allows the network
to gain comparable performance on both new (task-2 ) and old (task-1 ) tasks.
I encounter the numerical instability issue when developing the incremental learning
algorithm. By integrating my zero-bias layer with EWC along with locking prior layers,
I temporally mitigate the problem of catastrophic forgetting.

Numerical stability:

I compare the numerical stability of Fisher Loss during in-

cremental learning. The results in Figure 4.20 demonstrate that without applying the
exponential function as in Equation (4.11), the Fisher Loss is numerically unstable and
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(d) Regular dense layer, L2=0
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(e) Regular dense layer, L2=0.025
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(f) Regular dense layer, L2=0.05

Figure 4.19: Effects of L2 regularization.

gradually vanishes to zero (depicted by dashed lines). When Fisher Loss becomes zero,
the incremental learning algorithm can no longer penalize the neural network for forgetting the old tasks. In contrast, if the exponential function is applied, the Fisher Loss
never vanishes to zero and thus prevents catastrophic forgetting. As the incremental
learning moves on, the Fisher Loss gradually converges to a nonzero constant value, and
the results indicate that the zero-bias layer in my solution has a smoother converging
characteristic than the regular dense layer.
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Figure 4.20: Compare of numerical stability during incremental learning

4.2.5.4

Validation IV: Error Tendency Analysis

I analyze the error tendency of the trained zero-bias neural network as in section 4.1.3.
The cosine similarity matrix of devices’ fingerprints in the latent space is given in Fig-

Old

Cosine similarity

Cosine similarity

ure 4.21. Figure 4.21 also presents the cosine similarity matrix of device fingerprints after

task

New

task

Figure 4.21: Cosine similarity matrix of class fingerprint before and after
incremental learning

incremental learning (Elastic Weight Consolidation). Interestingly, the newly learned
devices’ fingerprints have much higher cosine similarity with the existing ones and can
explain the performance degration after incremental learning.
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Further Discussion

Multi-kernel Classification Using Zero-bias Neural Network

As discussed in Section 4.1.1, I prove that in neural networks decisions will be made
through a single kernel nearest neighbour matching process. Naturally, one may wonder
is it possible to turn the single kernel matching to a multiple kernel matching. To
explore the question, I first design a deep learning enabled dual-kernel nearest neighbour
matching scheme as depicted in Figure 4.22. As depicted, I will have two decision layers
to perform the cosine similarity matching.

Feature
extraction
layers

Input

Feature
vectors

Zero-bias dense
layer 1

Zero-bias dense
layer 2

Combined
vector

Softmax
layer

Results

Direct pass through
Activated by Relu function

Figure 4.22: The architecture of the dual-kernel classification neural network.

To prevent the two layers to learn identical fingerprints, I modify the loss function of
the model as:

L(Θ, F p11 · · · F p1n , F p21 · · · F p2n ) = LC + LK

n 
F p2i
1 X F p1i
1
1
2
2
LK (F p1 · · · F pn , F p1 · · · F pn ) =
·
n
||F p1i || ||F p2i ||
i=1

(4.21)

where LC denotes the classification loss in terms of cross entropy loss. LK is the averaged
kernel distance and denotes the averaged distances between corresponding fingerprints
within the two zero-bias layers. F p11 · · · F p1n and F p21 · · · F p2n denote the class fingerprints in the first and second zero-bias dense layers, respectively. In essence, for each
class, I want to encourage the neural network to find two sets of class representation
vectors (fingerprints) that are distantly distributed in the latent space.
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I test the network in Figure 4.22 as using the wireless device identification dataset. The
training process of the neural classifier is given in Figure 4.23. As depicted, I can divide
the training process of this network into two stages:

Learning to
classify
Tuning the kernels'
distances

Figure 4.23: Training of the dual-kernel neural classifier.

1. Learning to classify: In this stage, the optimization target is to minimize the
classification loss LC while average kernel distance LK grows.
2. Optimizing kernel distance: the target in this stage is to reduce the LK while
maintaining classification accuracy LC .

Although high classification accuracy is achieved, I discover that such a multi-kernel
strategy brings severe side effects on the networks’ performance on abnormality detection. One reason is that the neural network actually performs unnecessary vector
decomposition to reduce the term LK and the loss function, as depicted in Figure 4.24.
The unnecessarily decomposed fingerprints increases the spatial occupation of each class
thereby causing the degration of abnormality detection performance. I believe that
multi-kernel classification is not a good idea to be applied in neural classifiers.
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Class A features

Fingerprint A
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Class B features

Fingerprint B

The unnecessarily decomposed fingerprints
Some abnormal cases

Figure 4.24: Unnecessary decomposition of fingerprints

4.4

Concluding Remark

This chapter discusses the formalization and definition of the zero-bias neural network,
I then apply the zero-bias neural network to enhance the wireless transmitter identification problem. I make the decision process of deep neural network transparent and
enable neural networks to properly respond to unknown inputs. In the meantime, I provide a novel method to analyze the potential error risk within my zero-bias deep neural
networks. Furtherly, my zero-bias neural network performs better than regular neural
networks in terms of state-of-art incremental learning strategies. However, in specific
which human-like behaviors such as biases and preferabilities are expected, zero-bias
neural network may not be a good solution since zero-bias neural network would abandon making decisions according to its general experience, which is encoded in bias and
weights in the decision layer.

Chapter 5

Orthogonal Memory Organization
for Time Efficient Incremental
Learning in Wireless Device
Identification

In this chapter, I explore the topological properties of class representation vectors (class
fingerprints) in the latent space of deep neural networks, I discover that the main cause
of catastrophic forgetting is due to the nonoptimal distribution of feature vectors and
their representatives (fingerprints) in the latent space. I provide a new metric, the
Degree of Conflict (DoC), to quantitatively analyze the topological maturity of DNN
models. Based on the discoveries, I designed an enhanced IL scheme, the Channel
Separation Enabled Incremental Learning (CSIL). I automatically introduce separations
in representative spaces between different tasks (learning stages). The effectiveness of
the proposed framework in massive signal recognition and enhanced incremental learning
57
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has been demonstrated. My research is useful for the future development of IL for DNNs.
To my best knowledge, this is the first study that jointly explores DNN and IL in Signal
Intelligence Applications. Right before the publication of this work, I realized that my
algorithm actually has solid evidence from the most recent advancement of neural science
[70]. I share some similar findings as in [70], but from a totally different perspective
and a nonbiological road map. In addition, I provide the mathematical proof and are
delighted to find an elegant connection between biological and artificial intelligence.

5.1

Topological Characteristics of Class Representation Vectors

I discover that the last dense layer of a DNN classifier performs the nearest neighbor
matching with biases and preferabilities using cosine similarity, I also show that a DNN
classifier’s accuracy will not be impaired if I replace its last dense layer with a zero-bias
dense layer [71], in which the decision biases and preferabilities are eliminated. I can
denote the mechanism of zero-bias dense layer as (also in Figure 4.2):

Y1 (X) = W0 X + b
Y2 (X) = cosDistance(Y1 , W1 )

(5.1)

where X is the output of the prior convolution layers, a.k.a., feature vectors. X is an
N0 by q matrix, where N0 denotes the number of features while q denotes the batch
size. W0 is an N1 by N0 matrix where N1 denotes the dimension of fingerprints in
the latent space. W1 is a matrix to store fingerprints of different classes, namely the
similarity matching layer and it is a C by N1 matrix in which C denotes the number of

Chapter 5. Orthogonal Memory Organization for Incremental Learning

59

classes, I set N1 = 2C in this chapter. Please note that in W1 , each row represents a
fingerprint of corresponding class whilst in Y1 each column represents a feature vector
in the latent space. Intuitively, the last dense layer is spitted into two layers, L1 for
feature embedding and L2 for similarity matching. Considering the batch form, the
cosine similarity matching is denoted as:

cosDistance(Y1 , W1 ) = RU (W1 ) × CU (Y1 )

(5.2)

where RU (·) and CU (·) denote deriving column-wise and row-wise direction vectors
(vectors’ magnitudes are normalized to one) of their inputs. My prior results [71, 72]
prove that the zero-bias dense layer can work seamlessly with backpropagation mechanisms and trained using regular loss functions (e.g., binary crossentropy, etc.). Please
note that even if L2 can be replaced by a regular dense layer, it can also be viewed as a
similarity matching layer, but the matching results are weighted and biased [71].
The cosine similarity in Equation 5.1 represents the similarity matching of fingerprints
and feature vectors on an N1 -D unit hyperspherical surface.

5.1.1

Optimal Separation of Class Representation Vectors

Intuitively, if the devices’ fingerprints are distantly separated in the latent space, I will
have less chance to confuse them. To quantify the separation, the sum of the mutual
cosine distances of all devices’ fingerprints in a classification model can be defined as:

T D(f1 , · · · , fC ) =

C
X

CosineDistance(fi , fj )

i=2,j=1,j<i

=

C
X
i=2,j=1,j<i

(1) (1)

(2) (2)

(N 1) (N 1)
xj z

xi xj + xi xj + · · · + xi

(5.3)
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(2)

(N 1)

where fi = (xi , xi , · · · , xi

(1)

(2)

(N 1)

) and fj = (xj , xj , · · · , xj
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) are class fingerprint

vectors. Actually, T D(f1 , · · · , fC ) is the lower triangular summation of the class fingerprints’ cosine similarity matrix as in Figure 4.21
Suppose I have C classes with N1 -D fingerprint vectors. Noted that the fingerprints
have been scaled into unit vectors. Therefore, if I need to find the optimal value of
T D(·), I need to incorporate the constraints:

∀i, g(fi ) =

N1
X

(d)

(xi )2 − 1 = 0

(5.4)

d=1

Equation 5.3 has now become a constrained optimization problem. I solve this constrained optimization problem with the Lagrange Multiplier as:

L(f1 , · · · , fC , λ1 , · · · , λC )
= T D(f1 , · · · , fC ) −

C
X

λi g(fi )

(5.5)

i=1

And I need to solve:

∇
(1)

(N 1)

x1 ···x1

L(f1 · · · fC , λ1 · · · λC ) = 0

(5.6)

1
,··· ,x1C ···xN
C ,λ1 ···λi

which results in a linear system of equations. For each kth (k = 1 · · · N1 ) dimension of
(k)

(k)

fingerprint vectors x1 , · · · , xC , I have:

∂L
(k)
x1

(k)
xC

(i)

x1 = 0

i=1,i6=1

..
.
∂L

C
X

(k)

= −2λ1 x1 +

..
.

···
(k)

= −2λC xC +

C
X
i=1,i6=C

(i)

xC = 0

(5.7)

Chapter 5. Orthogonal Memory Organization for Incremental Learning

61

This is a homogeneous system of equations, and it is unlikely that it only has a trivial
solution (zeros). Hence, λ1 = λ2 = · · · = λC = −0.5 and Equation 5.7 can be converted
into one equation:

C
X

(k)

xi

=0

(5.8)

i=1

I square Equation 5.8 and expand it. According to Multinomial Theorem [73] I have:

C
X
(k)
(xi )2 + 2

C
X

(k)
x(k)
n xm = 0

(5.9)

n=1,m<n

i=1

Given that k = 1 · · · N1 , I have N1 Equations with an identical form of Equation 5.9.
By summing them up, I have:

N1 X
C
X

(k)

(xi )2 + 2

N1
X

C
X

(k)
x(k)
n xm = 0

(5.10)

k=1 n=1,m<n

k=1 i=1

On the left of Equation 5.10, the first part is the sum of the magnitude of fingerprint
vectors. And its value is C. The second part is exactly two times T D(f1 , · · · , fC ) in
Equation 5.3. Therefore, I have:
Theorem 5.1. Converging Point Theorem: The sum of the mutual cosine distances of
classes’ fingerprints of the zero-bias DNN at a converging point is a predictable constant:

T D(f1 , · · · , fC ) = −

C
2

(5.11)

When such a value is reached, the separation of fingerprints are maximized (with minimized interference) in the latent space, indicating the lowest degree of conflict. I will
use the term Degree of Conflict (DoC) to describe the characteristic of the zero-bias
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Figure 5.1: A comparison of regular and zero-bias DNN considering degree of
conflicts and training accuracy.

DNN. Noted that the range of DoC is from −

C
C(C − 1)
to
. The maximum value is
2
2

reached when all fingerprints collide into one single vector.
To demonstrate the Remark 5.1, I use a simple DNN [44] with two configurations. In the
first configuration, a regular dense layer is applied for the final classification. And in the
second configuration, the last dense layer is modified to perform the cosine similarity
matching as in Equation 5.1. The two models are trained on the hand-written digit
dataset (MNIST). And the change of DoC and accuracy during training are depicted
in Figure 5.1. In Figure 5.1a, the degree of conflict of zero-bias DNN model converges
to the predicted optimal constant −

10
= −5. However, in the regular DNN model,
2

the metric stops at a nonoptimal point, −3. Notably, higher accuracy could sometimes
reflect a lower DoC between fingerprints. Figure 5.1b also reveals that the zero-bias
DNN model is less sensitive to the variation of DoC.
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Conflict of Class Representation Vectors and Orthogonal Memory Representation

5.1.2.1

Catastrophic Forgetting and Degree of Conflicts

With the cosine similarity matching mechanism, one may assume that incremental learning can be performed by simply inserting new fingerprints. However, I discovered that
such an intuitive method could cause significant performance degradation. An important
factor to cause the performance degradation is the conflict of fingerprints.
To exemplify this phenomenon, I use two DNN models with an architecture specified
in Figure 4.11, I modify their last dense layers as in Figure 4.2, I use cosine similarity
matching in L2 for the first DNN model and use regular dense layer for L2 for the second
one, and therefore, the second DNN is a regular DNN. The two models are trained and
tested using a two-stage incremental learning scheme: a) in the first learning stage, the
two models are first trained on a wireless signal identification dataset [74] to classify 18
most frequently seen wireless devices. b) Before the second learning stage, I insert the
hypothetic fingerprints (generated by averaging feature vectors) of the remaining 16 new
devices into their similarity matching layers and freeze all prior layers and fingerprints
of learned devices. c) In the second stage, the IL stage, I finetune the newly inserted
fingerprints. After the two-stage learning, the cosine similarity matrix of fingerprints in
the two models before and after incremental learning is compared in Figure 5.2.
The results in Figure 5.2 indicate a typical conflict scheme. On the one hand, some
fingerprints of the newly learned classes (devices) are less distantly separated as they
have higher cosine similarities. On the other hand, some new devices’ fingerprints have
high cosine similarities with old devices’ fingerprints. These two factors jointly cause
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Figure 5.2: Distance matrix of fingerprints after inserting new fingerprints and
finetuning.

conflict and confusion. A more detail comparison is provided in Table 5.1. The two
models degrees of maturity after IL are far from the expected optimal value. And DoC
of the new fingerprints are also far from optimal.
Table 5.1: A comparison of the DoC of DNN models before and after incremental
learning.

DNN
models

DoC (Acc.)
initial training

DoC (Acc.)
a.f.t. finetuning

DoC of new
fingerprints

Acc. on new
/ old task

Regular
Zero-bias

-8.083 (90.54)
-8.96 (92.85)

-1.16 (65.2)
-4.3 (84.2)

9.05
4.03

75.5 / 54.2
76.2 / 91.3

Optimal value

-9

-18 (92.2)

-8

92.2 / 93.1

Remark 5.2. The conflict between class representation vectors is an important cause
of catastrophic forgetting.

Interestingly, the zero-bias DNN outperforms the regular DNN considering less catastrophic forgetting,

5.1.2.2

Orthogonal Memory Organization and Proof of Optimality

Theorem 5.1 will provide us a tool to explore catastrophic forgetting. Suppose that I
have N1 classes at the initial stage and m new classes to learn afterwards. I define that
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the averaged cosine distance between N1 fingerprints is D0 , according to Remark 5.1,
after initial training I have

N1 (N1 − 1)
pairs of cosine similarity values, according to
2

Theorem 5.1 I have:

N1 (N1 − 1)
N1
1
D0 = −
and D0 = −
2
2
N1 − 1

(5.12)

when there are N1 + m classes, D0 has to become:

D1 = −

1
N1 + m − 1

(5.13)

It means that if the classes’ fingerprints are to be distantly and uniformly separated,
the averaged angles of all old fingerprints need to be reduced while learning new classes.
This requirement can not be satisfied if the old fingerprints are locked or prevented from
changing.
When the prior layers are locked, the distribution of feature vectors in the latent space
is fixed, simply reducing the separation of fingerprints in old classes will increase the
degree of conflict and cause performance degradation, as depicted in Figure 5.1b.
Remark 5.3. In regular neural networks, without readjustment of old fingerprints or
proper separation between old and new fingerprints, the conflict between fingerprints
can not be resolved. Under such criteria, the resulting DNN’s performance will not be
comparable to training with all data from scratch.

Dynamically adjusting the separation angles of all existing classes while inserting new
classes is computationally difficult. However, there are several solutions I can apply to
theoretically avoid introducing new interference or conflicts during increment learning:
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Lemma 5.4. The dual orthogonality criteria: If the newly inserted classes’ fingerprints
are mutually orthogonal in the task-specific subspace (Intra-Class Orthogonality), and
they are orthogonal to the existing ones (Inter-Class Orthogonality), the incremental
learning process will not introduce any unwanted conflict.

Proof. Suppose that I have C +m classes in which m classes are introduced by increment
learning. Equation (5.3) can be expressed as (also in Figure 5.3):

C+m
X

T D(f1 · · · fC , fC+1 · · · fm ) =

CosineDistance(fi , fj )

i=2,j=1,j<i

=T D(f1 , · · · , fC ) + T D(fC+1 , · · · , fm ) + SD(f1 · · · fC , fC+1 · · · fm )

1

C

C

(5.14)

C+m

Old task
Intersection

New task

C+m

Figure 5.3: Lower triangular proportion of fingerprint cosine similarity matrix after
incremental learning.

where T D(f1 , · · · , fC ) is the DoC of existing classes’ fingerprints. As represented by
the green triangle in Figure 5.3.

T D(f1 , · · · , fC ) =

C
X
i=2,j=1,j<i

CosineDistance(fi , fj )

(5.15)
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T D(fC+1 , · · · , fm ) is the DoC of new classes’ fingerprints, As represented by the blue
triangle in Figure 5.3.

m
X

T D(fC+1 , · · · , fm ) =

CosineDistance(fk , fl )

(5.16)

k=C+1,l=C+2,k<l

The last term SD(f1 · · · fC , fC+1 · · · fm ) is the sum of the pairwise cosine similarity
between new and old classes’ fingerprints. As represented by the red rectangle in Figure 5.3.

SD(f1 · · · fC , fC+1 · · · fm ) =

r=m,s=C
X

CosineDistance(fr , fs )

(5.17)

r=C+1,s=1

If the new classes’ fingerprints are mutually orthogonal in their task-specific subspace,
satisfying the Intra-Class Orthogonality condition. And in the meantime, if they are
orthogonal to the existing ones, satisfying the Inter-Class Orthogonality condition, then
I have:

T D(fC+1 , · · · , fm ) = 0

(5.18)

SD(f1 · · · fC , fC+1 · · · fm ) = 0

(5.19)

T D(f1 · · · fC , fC+1 · · · fm ) = T D(f1 · · · fC )

(5.20)

That is:

Therefore, the unwanted conflict will not be introduced.

Keeping the newly inserted fingerprints mutually orthogonal is not easy. However,
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Equation (5.18) indicates that I only need to let the DoC of new classes to approximate
zero. Since T D(fC+1 , · · · , fm ) is an aggregated value, therefore, I do not need to
constrain the class fingerprints of new classes to be strictly orthogonal. Therefore, I can
rewrite Lemma 5.4 into:
Theorem 5.5. Approximated Orthogonal Incremental Learning Theorem: If the newly
inserted classes’ fingerprints are with a DoC value close to zero and they are orthogonal
to the existing ones, the incremental learning process will not introduce any unwanted
conflict.

I provide an intuitive way to keep the newly inserted classes’ fingerprints at any learning
stage to approximate zero:
Theorem 5.6. Orthogonality Approximation Theorem: To minimize the mutual interference, the separation of class representation vectors (class fingerprints) approximates a
mutually orthogonal relationship within the latent space as long as the number of classes
is increased.

Proof. Let D1 be the averaged cosine similarity between fingerprints, according to Theorem 5.1 and Equation (5.12), if I have N1 classes, at the converging point where
conflict between fingerprints is minimized, I will have
D0 = −

N1 (N1 − 1)
−N1
D1 =
and
2
2

1
.
N1 − 1

Therefore, D1 approximates zero when N1 becomes larger. It means the averaged separation angle of fingerprints approximates 90 degrees (orthogonal).

Theorem 5.6 also explains the phenomenon that the larger the number of classes in each
stage becomes, the less catastrophic forgetting there will be during incremental learning
as in [75–78].

Chapter 5. Orthogonal Memory Organization for Incremental Learning

69

Theorem 5.1, 5.5 and 5.6 provides the following guidelines for designing incremental
learning algorithms:

1. Learn as much classes as possible to satisfy the intra-class orthogonality condition.
2. Class fingerprints at each stage should be separated into their own subspace. And
the subspaces of different learning stages should be mutually orthogonal so as to
satisfy the inter-class orthogonality condition.

These guidelines motivate the new incremental learning strategy, The Channel Separation Enabled Incremental Learning (CSIL) Strategy.

5.2

Channel Separation Incremental Learning (CSIL)

To resolve the conflict of fingerprints, I proposed the Channel Separation Enabled Incremental Learning (CSIL), an integral approach incorporating dimension expansion and
channel separation as depicted in Figure 5.4. Intuitively, the merits of this approach
are: a) the class fingerprints at different stages automatically use their task-specific proportions (channels) of parameters in the feature embedding layer. b) the directions of
fingerprints from different stages are constrained to be orthogonally separated.
At the initial stage, namely stage-0, I train a zero-bias DNN as normal. When at the
kth learning stage, stage-k. I first expand the feature embedding layer’s weight matrix
as:

(k)

W0


=


(k−1)
W0

(k)
w0

(5.21)
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Figure 5.4: Channel separation for incremental learning
(k−1)

where W0

is the weight matrix of the feature embedding layer in (k − 1)th stage and

w0 is the expanded proportion for the kth task. I then expand the similarity matching
layer of the network as:

(k)

W1

(k−1)

where W1


=




(k−1)
W1

0

0

(k)
w1





(5.22)

is the weight matrix of the similarity matching layer at in the (k − 1)th

stage and w1 is the fingerprints for the kth task. The manually inserted zeros on the one
hand keep the fingerprints in different stages orthogonal (depicted in Figure 5.5), on the
other hand, they enable the feature embedding layer to learn task-specific parameters
in different regions (a.k.a. channels). For instance, in Equation 5.22, the newly inserted
(k)

fingerprints in w1

(k)

only make use of embedded features from w0

in Equation 5.21.

I only train the network with data from the kth stage, I use Knowledge Distillation (KD
[79]) and Elastic Weight Consolidation (EWC [35]) to prevent the model from forgetting.
Therefore, the loss function is defined as:

L(Θk−1 , θk , Gm , Xk ) = LCE + LD + LEW C

(5.23)
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(k)

(k)

where Θk−1 denotes the models’ weight at the (k − 1)th stage. And θk = {w0 , w1 }
denotes the extended weights for the kth stage. Gm is a mask matrix, in which the
value of each element can only be zero or one. These elements are one-to-one bound to
the parameters of a neural network to control which parameter is locked or unlocked.
Xk is the training data of the kth stage. LCE is the cross entropy loss of the new task.
LD is the Knowledge Distillation loss:

LD = kRk−1 (Xk ) − Rk (Xk )k

(5.24)

where Rk−1 (Xk ) is the response of (k − 1)th model on Xk and Rk (Xk ) is the response of the kth model. F (·) denotes the output of the similarity matching layer (L2 ).
Knowledge Distillation aims to penalize DNNs’ behavior from changing drastically.
LEW C in Equation 5.23 represents the Elastic Weight Consolidation (EWC) loss. In
EWC, Fisher Information Loss is used to measure the importance of existing parameters,
I define EWC Loss for incremental learning as:

LEW C (Θk ) =

1X
[Fk−1 · (Θk − Θk−1 )2 ]
2

(5.25)

i

where Fk−1 denotes the Fisher Information (FI) matrix with respect to the (k − 1)th
task. Intuitively, this loss function penalizes the change of critical parameters. The
matrix can be estimated as:



Fk−1

∂ log P (Xk−1 |Θk−1 )
=
∂Θk−1

2

P (Xk−1 |Θk−1 ) ≈ YSof tmax (Xk−1 |Θk−1 )

(5.26)
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Figure 5.5: Distance matrix of fingerprints after regular training and CSIL.

where YSof tmax (Xk−1 |Θk−1 ) denotes the averaged outputs of Softmax layer on validation set Xk−1 given parameter set Ω, it approximates the posterior probability
P (Xk−1 |Θk−1 ). Fk−1 denotes the Fisher information matrix.
To exemplify the concept, in Figure 5.5, I compare the fingerprints’ cosine similarity
matrix after regular training and CSIL using the same dataset and scheme specified in
Section 5.1.2. In this experiment, the convolution layers, the channels for the old task
in the feature embedding layer, and the manually supplemented zeros in the similarity
matching layer are locked. As a comparison, the DoC of fingerprints is much less apparent compared to Figure 5.2. A more systematic comparison is provided in Section 5.3.
More details about this experiment are presented in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: A comparison of the degree of conflicts of DNN models with different
training strategies.

Training
strategy

DoC (Acc.)

DoC of new
/ old fingerprints

Acc. on new
/ old task

Regular

-16.25 (92.85)

n/a

92.85

CSIL

-16.15 (88.6)

-8.9 / -7.21

91.2 / 87

Optimal value

-17

-9 (-8)

100 / 100
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Application of CSIL in Wireless Device Identification

Introduction

A typical way to implement smart decision functionality in IoT is by integrating learningenabled components through Deep Learning (DL) and Deep Neural Networks (DNNs).
One typical application of DNNs in IoT is the passive identification of IoT devices
through their wireless signals for Non-cryptographic Device Identification (NDI) and
Physical Layer authentication [48, 80, 81]. DL and DNNs are effective in wireless device
identification under various scenarios, however, DNN models in these applications need
to be continuous evolving to adapt to operational variations as new devices (as new
classes) are emerging. Such a continuous evolving scheme is termed as Lifelong or
Incremental Learning (IL).
Conventional approaches require periodic retraining to update DNNs. In this paradigm,
DNNs are initialized from scratch and trained with all past and present devices’ signals.
Even though the best accuracies are guaranteed in these Non-Incremental Learning
(Non-IL) schemes, the memory consumption and training time can grow drastically as
new devices are added in. Therefore, there is a need for IL with a reasonable balance
between accuracy, memory consumption, and training efficiency. In IoT, less or zero
memory for historical data are preferred during the continuous evolving [82].
Compared to conventional non-incremental learning (non-IL) schemes, DNN models can
only use a very small proportion or even none of the data from the previous stages, a.k.a.
old tasks, while they are trained to recognize new devices. The absence of data from
old tasks results in Catastrophic Forgetting, a phenomenon of significant degradation of
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accuracy after training on new tasks. IL has become an emerging topic in machine learning, however, many of the methods are not adaptable in IoT. For example, some works
require storing specifically chosen old data and can consume a large amount of memory
[75] gradually. Other works require incrementally training task-related generative models for knowledge replay, but these generative models require notorious efforts [83]. In
addition, there are several attempts to either use regularization or knowledge distillation to implement memoryless methods to prevent DNNs from forgetting [82]. Balancing
between learning and forgetting is difficult, especially when the internal mechanism of
catastrophic forgetting is not yet clear. Besides, there is a lack of theoretic explanation to explore the difference between the key characteristics between IL and regularly
trained models.
In this application, I apply the channel separation incremental learning strategy for timeefficient incremental learning in non-cryptographic device identification of IoT. I provide
a comprehensive comparison of my CSIL strategy with other IL approaches without
storing past data using massive signal recognition systems. To my best knowledge, this
is the first study that jointly explores DNN and IL in Signal Intelligence Applications

5.3.2

Evaluation Dataset

I use real-world ADS-B signals to verify IL methods for wireless device identification.
ADS-B signals are transmitted by commercial aircraft to periodically broadcast their
enroute information to Air Traffic Control (ATC) Centers in plain text. These signals
are easy to receive and decode but are subject to identity spoofing attacks. I configure
my SDR receiver (USRP B210) with a sample rate of 8MHz at 1090MHz, and for each
piece of intercepted message, I use the first 1024 complex samples. This dataset is
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publicly available at [84]. I first decode the ADS-B signals using a modified version of
Gr-ADS-B in [74] to extract the payloads, then the aircraft’s identity codes are used as
labels for the truncated messages’ signals. I filter out the wireless transponders with less
than 500 samples and use the top 100 most frequently seen transponders to construct
the dataset. As in Section 4.2.4.2, I extract the pseudonoise supplemented with the
frequency domain information, I convert each truncated message signal into a 32 by
32 by 3 tensor. Finally, I got 100 wireless transponders. I use 60% of the dataset for
training and the remaining 40% of the dataset for validation.

5.3.3

Performance Evaluation

In this subsection, I compare the CSIL algorithm with other incremental learning algorithms that do not require historical data. The configurations of the selected methods
are as follows:

• Channel Separation Enabled Incremental Learning (CSIL): I lock the
convolution layers and channels in the feature embedding layer which are used by
old tasks. I train the new task-specific channels and fingerprints of devices.
• Learning without Forgetting (LwF): I lock the convolution layers and the
feature embedding layer, I use LwF to train the similarity matching layer.
• Elastic Weight Consolidation: (EWC)I lock the convolution layer and feature
embedding layer, I train the whole similarity matching layer. The EWC algorithm
can adjust old and new fingerprints simultaneously.
• Finetuning: I lock the convolution layer, the feature embedding layer, and the
old fingerprints, I train the similarity matching layer with new fingerprints.
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In these configurations, I set the initial learning rate to be 0.01, momentum to 0.9, and
L2 regularization factor to be 0.01. Stochastic Gradient Descent is selected. I divide
the data tensors from 100 wireless devices into 5 batches. I first train the selected DNN
model with 20 randomly selected devices and then incrementally train the model with
other data batches. During incremental training, the batch size is set to 64 and the
models are trained for 10 epoches.
I compare their resulting models’ performance on old and incrementally learned new
devices as in Figure 5.7. Since no historical data is available during incremental learning, forgetting of old tasks are unavoidable. From Figure 5.7a, the performances of
all selected IL algorithms in recognizing new devices are close to the optimal non-IL
scheme, in which the proposed CSIL yields the highest accuracy after IL while finetuning with locked old fingerprints shows the worst result. Comparably, in Figure 5.7b,
in preventing forgetting, CSIL’s performance is not as good as finetuning with locked
weights after learning more than 60 wireless devices (classes). Finetunning with locked
weights prevents DNN models from forgetting but with a side effect that prevents the
network from learning new devices. The overall performance is given in Figure 5.7c, my
proposed algorithm CSIL yields the best performance on both old and new tasks.
A comparison of the metric, the Degree of Conflict (DoC), of all devices’ fingerprints
during incremental learning, is given in Figure 5.6. The propose method, CSIL, yields
the lowest DoC. Please note that the models’ DoC values are still lower than the optimal
values (please refer to Equation 5.11) after incremental learning.
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Figure 5.7: Comparison of incremental learning strategies for wireless device
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Ablation Analysis

I compare the averaged stage loss of the CSIL considering three factors: a) the Fisher
loss. b) The Knowledge Distillation loss. c) The effect of channel separation. The results
of ablation analysis are given in Table 5.3. Apparently, the integral method combining
channel separation, EWC, and Knowledge Distillation provides the best performance.
Table 5.3: Ablation analysis of CSIL. All metrics are in percentage.
Approaches
CS
CS
CS
CS

+
+
+
+

EWC
EWC
EWC
EWC

+
+
+
+

KD
KD
KD
KD

Initial Acc.1
95.2
95.2
95.2
95.2

Acc. with all New acc. at
100 devices 2 the last stage

Old acc. at
the last stage

Forget / stage

83.5
75.3
70.5
70.5

73
66.3
50
50.2

4.5
5.78
9
9

90
82.4
91
91

3

1 Identification

accuracy on the first 20 devices, at this stage the network is trained from scratch.
accuracy (100 devices) after the last stage of incremental learning.
3 Averaged decrease of accuracy on all trained devices after each incremental learning stage.
2 Overall

Notably, without channel separation, the combination of elastic weight consolidation and
knowledge distillation can also prevent the network from forgetting. However, such a
combination also prevents the network from learning new tasks. Therefore, elastic weight
consolidation and knowledge distillation jointly prevent the network from forgetting
old devices when training on new tasks, meanwhile, the channel separation mechanism
prevents the conflict of class-specific fingerprints.
A more detailed comparison is presented in Figure 5.8. In Figure 5.8a, if the channel
separation mechanism is not available, the DNN model will not perform well in learning
new devices (classes), as analyzed in Remark 5.3, the incrementally inserted fingerprints
of new devices can conflict with the existing ones, causing the performance degradation.
In Figure 5.8b, the integral solution, CSIL, yields the highest accuracy in terms of
memorizing old devices. Interestingly, the integral of knowledge distillation and elastic
weight consolidation ranks the second place in memorizing old devices while showing

New task accuracy
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Figure 5.8: Comparison influential factors in CSIL during incremental learning

the worst performance for learning new ones. Therefore, the CSIL provides the best
balanced performance between learning and forgetting.

5.4

Further Disscussion: Local Degree of Conflict During
Incremental Learning

To provide a more explicit analysis on the catastrophic forgetting, I did some more
exploration on the topological characteristic classes’ fingerprints. I analyze the degree
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of conflict of fingerprints during different learning stages using the same dataset and
configuration as in Section 5.3.2 and Section 5.3.3. This part of discussion aims to
verify Theorem 5.5 from a empirical perspective.
Definition 5.7. Local Degree of Conflict (DoC): I define that the degree of conflict of
a subgroup of classes is the local degree of conflict. A subgroup can consist of classes
learned at a specific stage.

Firstly, I compare the variation of the local DoC of fingerprints in the zero-bias neural
network with the finetune for incremental learning. The architecture of the network
is specified in Figure 4.11 with results in Figure 5.9. I consolidate all old weights and
finetune new classes’ fingerprints in the decision layer. As depicted, the test accuracy of
the oldest task (Task-1) reduces slightly as the incremental learning moves on. However,
the local DoC values of the newly learned tasks (from Task 2 to 5) increase drastically.
Indicating that it has become increasingly difficult for new classes’ fingerprints to be
optimized as specified in Converging Point Theorem (Theorem 5.1).
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Figure 5.9: Local Degree of Conflict of finetune with weight consolidation

Secondly, I compare the local DoC of Elastic Weight Consolidation (EWC) as depicted
in Figure 5.10. As depicted, the DoC of the oldest task (Task-1) grows significantly
during incremental learning while the test accuracy decreases as learning moves on.
This phenomenon also applies to other tasks and learning stages, indicating that the
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topological characteristic of classes in old tasks will be destroyed, gradually causing
interference in the latent space.
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Figure 5.10: Local Degree of Conflict of regular EWC with weight consolidation

Thirdly, I design a Conflict-Aware Elastic Weight Consolidation (CEWC) algorithm,
specifically, the algorithm dynamically checks the local DoC of previous tasks, once
the local DoC of fingerprints in a specific task group becomes greater than zero, the
weights in this group will be frozen to prevent getting worse. The results are depicted
in Figure 5.11. As depicted, even if the topological characteristics of old tasks are
protected, but since there is no proper separation strategy, the accuracies of old tasks
still decrease as learning moves on.
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Figure 5.11: Local Degree of Conflict of regular EWC with weight consolidation

These experiments show that without proper separation in the latent space of old and
new tasks, the local DoC of new tasks can be far from optimal, while the topological
characteristics of old tasks would be destroyed gradually when not protected.
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Finally, I did the same experiment using the CSIL strategy, with the results given in
Figure 5.12. Topologically, the local DoC of task-2, 3, 4 are closer to the optimal value
while the local DoC of Task-5 fails to reach the optimal value. Further experiment
shows that the problem can be easily fixed as by using a tiny amount of historical data.
Therefore, CSIL still has better performance than state-of-art memoryless incremental
learning algorithms.
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Figure 5.12: Local Degree of Conflict of CSIL

5.5

Concluding Remark

In this chapter, I analyze the catastrophic forgetting problem of incremental learning
from a new and more thorough perspective, the conflict of class-specific fingerprints. I
also propose a novel incremental learning algorithm without using historical data.
My contributions are as follows:

1. I provide a new metric, Degree of Conflict (DoC), to measure the degree of topological maturity of DNN models and discover that one important cause for performance degradation in IL is the conflict of classes’ representative fingerprints, in
which the fingerprints of different classes are with high cosine similarity, thereby
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causing confusion. I also prove that a minimal confusion solution is to keep those
fingerprints mutually orthogonal.
2. I show that the conventional IL schemes without using historical data, can lead
to DNN models with low topological maturity and high DoC. I discovered and
proved the principle rules to design a reliable incremental learning strategy.
3. based on the theoretic analysis, I propose a new IL scheme, the CSIL, based
on channel separation and topological control of devices’ fingerprints at different
stages of learning. I evaluation my proposed solution using the raw signal records
from more than 100 aircraft’s wireless transponders, and the experiments demonstrate that my CSIL strategy provides the best balance between learning new
devices incrementally while retaining the memory of old devices.

I believe the CSIL and the metric for quantifying the topological maturity of DNN
models can be generalized to other domains, such as virus detection or medical image
classification.

Chapter 6

Deep Learning Enabled Quickest
Event Detection with Application
in Identity Spoofing Detection

In this chapter, I utilize an enhanced deep learning framework based on my previous
work [71], the zero-bias deep neural network, for quick and reliable detection of abnormalities with assured performance. I use zero-bias dense layers to facilitate DNNs with
both assured and explainable performance in distinguishing known or abnormal inputs.
I model the topological characteristics of the latent space and design a parametric quickest detection algorithm. In this way, the abnormality detection system can rapidly react
to abnormalities with minimum latency under specified false alarm constraints. Furthermore, my solution efficiently derives single-shot abnormality detectors from existing
DNN classifiers. The effectiveness of the proposed framework in handling massive signal
recognition has been demonstrated.
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Regional Association Characteristics of Zero-bias Neural Network

As discussed in Section 5.1 and Equation 5.1, the cosine similarity matching feature
of the zero-bias neural network is equivalent to the angular similarity matching of fingerprints and feature vectors on a high dimension unit hyperspherical surface. A 3-D
example is depicted in Figure 6.1. Fingerprints divide the unit hyperspherical surface
into several subregions, and I can reduce the dimension of fingerprints and use Voronoi
Diagram [85] to visualize their decision boundaries as in Figure 6.2. The decision boundaries of a specific fingerprint denote the boundaries of a class. Herein, I will use the
terms class boundaries and fingerprint’s boundaries alternatively.

Class A

Class X

Class B

Figure 6.1: 3D unit hyperspherical surface in zero-bias DNNs.

For example, in the DNN enabled MNIST handwritten digit recognition [44], the network’s last dense layer is replaced by a zero-bias dense layer with N1 = 10. The Voronoi
diagrams at two stages (85% and 97% accuracies) using fingerprints in the zero-bias
dense layer and feature vectors from the validation set are depicted in Figure 6.2 with
solid blue lines representing the decision boundaries of topologically adjacent classes.
Please note that the Voronoi diagram can not be applied directly to DNN models without adapting zero-bias dense layers.
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Figure 6.2: Stacked diagrams of: a) Voronoi graph of remapped fingerprints. b)
Class decision boundaries. c) remapped validation and abnormal data feature
vectors. The two subfigures are taken at different training stages with all data points
projected to a 2D space using t-SNE algorithm [1].

From the observation, I conclude that during training, a DNN with a zero-bias dense
layer learns to project input data from identical classes closer to the corresponding
fingerprints and separate data from different classes far away. The feature extractors in
prior layers and fingerprints in the zero-bias dense layer are optimized simultaneously.
In DNNs with zero-bias dense layer, classification errors result from two perspectives:
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• If fingerprints are not distantly separated, data from the corresponding classes are
highly possible to get confused. This fact is verified in my previous work in [71].
• The prior layers are poorly trained and the feature vectors are sparsely projected
as depicted in Figure 4.6a.

Please note that, firstly, even if I eliminate the magnitude and bias constant for each
fingerprint, I do not need to worry about the capacity of zero-bias DNN models in distinguishing different classes. A numerical example for quantifying the maximum theoretic
number of classes that a zero-bias DNN will reliably learn is given in Figure 6.5b. Secondly, zero-bias dense layer can be easily adapted to existing DNN models via transfer
learning.

6.1.1

Abnormality detection in DNN with zero-bias dense layer

The effectiveness of zero-bias DNN for single-shot abnormality detection has been demonstrated in my prior results [71, 72], briefly, it is significant better than regular DNN and
comparable to one-class SVM [86]. In this section, I deepen my previous research and
present a solution to convert zero-bias DNN models into abnormality detectors with
predictable and assurable performance.

6.1.1.1

Deriving Abnormality Detectors from Existing DNN Classifiers

In Figure 4.6b, feature vectors from known classes are closely projected to the vicinity
of the corresponding fingerprints. As a result of cosine similarity matching, I come to
my first remark:
Remark 6.1. Abnormal data from an unknown novel class are less likely to be projected
into any existing classes’ close vicinity as there is no specific fingerprint for these data.
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I use the MNIST example to demonstrate Remark 6.1 with the results in Figure 6.3. I
train the zero-bias DNN to recognize handwritten digits from 1 to 8 and use digits 9
and 0 as abnormal data. The projection feature vectors of known and abnormal data
and fingerprints are depicted in Figure 6.3a. I then replace the abnormal data with pure
Gaussian random noise (N (0, 2)) and repeat the experiment. Results are depicted in
Figure 6.3b.
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Figure 6.3: Stacked diagrams of: a) Voronoi graph of remapped fingerprints. b)
Class decision boundaries. c) remapped validation and abnormal data feature
vectors. Data are projected to a 2D space using t-SNE algorithm [1].

From these results, abnormalities from an unknown class of the same domain could
be even more difficult to detect than pure random noise. Although Figure 6.3a has
shown that abnormalities from unknown classes are more sparsely distributed in the unit
hyperspherical surface, Remark 6.1 still holds. Therefore, I can derive a basic principle
(depicted in Figure 6.4) to convert a zero-bias dense layer enabled DNN classifier into
an abnormality detector:
Remark 6.2. I can model the spatial distribution and boundaries of normal data in
the hyperspherical surface. Then the incoming feature vectors that are out of normal
data boundaries are regarded as abnormalities. For simplicity, I only need to find a hard
cut-off distance for each class representative fingerprint (suppose each class fingerprint
is at the centroid of its corresponding feature cluster).
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Figure 6.4: Relation of normal and abnormal data.

For a given DNN model with zero-bias dense layer, I model the boundaries of different
classes as follows:

Step 1: The training set is utilized to learn the boundaries of known classes while the
validation set will be mixed with abnormal data (A0 ) to measure the performance of converted abnormality detector.
Step 2: I pass accurately classified data of each known class in C1 , denoted as KXi ,
through the DNN model and obtain the compressed feature vectors before
fingerprint matching, denoted as:

Y0 [Fn−1 (KXi )] = W0 Fn−1 (KXi ) + b

(6.1)

where W0 and b are defined in Equation 5.1, F (·)n−1 denotes all network
layers before the fingerprint matching. Y0 [Fn−1 (KXi )] denotes feature vectors
of accurately classified data in KXi .
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Step 3: Calculate the centroid ci0 and covariance matrix (Pi ) of KXi as:

ci0 = mean(Y0 [Fn−1 (KXi )])

(6.2)

Pi = cov(Y0 [Fn−1 (KXi )], Y0 [Fn−1 (KXi )])

Step 4: Calculate the Mahalanobis distances [87] from the class centroid ci0 to all accurately classified feature vectors. Then I use the maximum value as a cut-off
distance COi of class KXi :

COi = max Dm [Y0 [Fn−1 (KXi )], ci0 ]

(6.3)

where Dm (·, ci0 ) denotes the feature vectors’ Mahalanobis distances to ci0 .
Step 5: Abnormality detection using cut-off boundaries on input data X) is formally
defined as:

D(X) =






1 ∃ i, Dm [Y0 [Fn−1 (X)], ci0 ] ≤ COi

(6.4)





0 Otherwise

These steps convert zero-bias DNNs into abnormality detectors with binary outputs. In
essence, this is a discretization process that transforms the continuous response characteristics of DNNs into two simple Bernoulli distributions. Herein, I will use the term
zero-bias abnormality detector alternatively. In essence, I construct statistical models
for each class to describe the distribution of corresponding normal data and a hard cutoff distance to form its boundary (denoted as dashed purple lines in Figure 6.4). Please
note that other distance functions or modeling methods such as the Local Outlier Factor
[88] can also be applied.
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Suppose that each fingerprint governs a non-overlapped subregion with a maximum
acceptable deviation angle, σ, for normal data. This subregion is named σ-cap, I can
analytically evaluate the area of each σ-cap, and its occupied area ratio, r0 (m), as:

1
Ac (m) = Au (m)rn−1 I(2rh−h2 )/r2
2
Au (m) =



m−1 1
,
2
2



2π n/2
Γ(n/2)

Ac (m)
1
r0 (m) =
= I(2h−h2 )
Au (m)
2



m−1 1
,
2
2


(6.5)

where Ac (m) is the area of a m-D σ-cap. Au (m) is the surface area of the m-D unit
hypersphere. Additionally, I have r = 1 and h = r −rcos(σ). I and Γ are the regularized
incomplete beta function and the gamma function, respectively. A numerical result
is given in Figure 6.5. As depicted, both a smaller σ and larger number of feature
dimensions (N1 ) increase the capacity and interclass distinguishability of the zero-bias
DNN. Moreover, even if I eliminate some information of feature vectors in zero-bias
DNNs, I do not have to worry much about their learning capacity and remaining space
for abnormalities, as long as the feature dimension N1 is large.

6.1.1.2

Theoretic Performance Analysis of the Single-Shot Binary Abnormality Detector

I introduce the hard cut-off distances from class fingerprints. Therefore, a binary abnormality detector converted from zero-bias DNN becomes a binary classifier. I derive
two important properties of this type of zero-bias abnormality detector regarding false
positive and false negative rates. This step is to determine the range of parameters of
the coverted binary abnormality detector specified in Section 6.1.1.1, therefore, I define
it as the parametrization process.
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Figure 6.5: The coverage ration per class and maximum number of distinguishable
class in zero-bias DNN.

The accuracy of zero-bias DNN models on known classes can be obtained after training.
From the perspective of decision boundary and class boundary, the scenarios that lead
to classification error are depicted in Figure 6.6. As depicted, the feature vectors C and
D are projected into the wrong class boundaries but out of the boundaries of normal
data. Meanwhile, E and F are projected into the normal data boundaries of wrong
fingerprints.
Suppose that E and F in Figure 6.6 are moved out of the normal data boundaries.
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Figure 6.6: Classification errors in zero-bias DNN, feature vector C, D, E and F are
erroneously projected into governing regions of wrong fingerprints.

The false positive rate of abnormality detection reaches its upper bound and equals the
classification error α. Furthermore, if C and D are moved into normal data boundaries,
the false positive rate equals zero. Therefore, the range of false-positive rate of zero-bias
abnormality detector is actually determined:
Remark 6.3 (Range of the false positive rate). Suppose that the classification error of
the zero-bias DNN is α, as long as my statistical model can closely follow the boundary
of normal data, the false positive rate of converted abnormality detector is less than or
equals to α. Denoted as:

FPR ≤ α

(6.6)

Suppose that in a regular case, the feature vectors of abnormalities are mixed with
normal data and uniformly distributed on the surface of the unit hypersphere, in this
case, the maximum false negative rate is reached.
Remark 6.4 (Range of false negative (true positive) rates). The upper bound of the
false negative rate under uniformly distributed abnormalities, equals to ratio of the
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occupied regions’ area of normal data divided by the total surface area of the unit
hypersphere, denoted as:
PNc
RUF N R =

i
i=1 Shsp (N1 )

Ahsp (N1 )

With F N R ≤ RUF N R , T P R ≥ 1 − RUF N R

(6.7)

where Nc is the number of known classes, N1 and Ahsp (N1 ) are the dimension and surface
i (N ) is the surface area of normal data
area of the unit hypersphere, respectively. Shsp
1

of the ith class.
Algorithm 1 Estimating RUF N R
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:

function RUF N R (N1 , Nc , M, List[CO], List[ci0 ])
HX ← U nif ormHypersphereRand(N1 , M )
chx ← 0
for k ← 1 . . . M do
for i ← 1 . . . Nc do
if Dm [HXk , ci0 ] ≤ COi then
chx ← chx + 1
end if
end for
end for
chx
return
M
end function

. Please refer to [89]

i (N ) is difficult since the shapes of these occupied subreAnalytically calculating Shsp
1

gions are unknown. Therefore, I use Monte Carlo method to estimate RUF N R directly.
Corresponding pseudo code is presented in Algorithm 1, specifically, I generate M random points uniformly distributed on the surface of the unit hypersphere and count the
ratio of points that are captured by the normal data boundaries of fingerprints. The
captured rate directly indicates the value of RUF N R . Empirically, I set M = 20, 000.
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Zero-bias DNN for Quickest Abnormal Event Detection

In this section, I will introduce the method to integrate a single-shot zero-bias binary
abnormality detector with quickest detection algorithm.

6.2.1

Sequential Formalization And Detectability

Given the theoretic analysis of zero-bias abnormality detector in section 6.1.1.2, I can
model the response of zero-bias DNNs as switching between two probability distributions
before and after the appearance of an abnormal event, namely P0 and P1 , respectively.
Since I have converted the zero-bias DNN into a binary abnormality detector, I can
formulate P0 and P1 into two Bernoulli Distributions [90]:

P0 (Ik ) = F P RkI (1 − F P R)1−Ik
P1 (Ik ) = (1 − F N R)Ik F N R1−Ik = (T P R)Ik (1 − T P R)1−Ik

(6.8)

where I ∈ {0, 1} is the binary output of the abnormality detector with Ik = D(Xk ).
F P R can be deried on existing data, and the range of F N R and T P R from section 6.1.1.2. As long as the P0 and P1 are different, the abnormal event causing drifts
from P0 to P1 can be sequentially detected. I have the following determinant under
regular scenarios:
Remark 6.5 (Sequential detectability). Abnormal events are assured to be sequentially
detectable if the binary zero-bias detector’s true-positive rate (T P R) lower bound (1 −
RUF N R ) are greater than the false-positive rate (F P R) upper bound (α).
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Remark 6.4 shows that the true positive and false negative rates are within different
ranges, if 1 − RUF N R ≤ α, the two variables’ spanning ranges are partially overlapped
(depicted in Figure 6.7) and I may encounter an extreme case: T P R = F P R. Therefore,
the abnormal event is only conditionally detectable. Please note that we can definitely
use the Kullback–Leibler divergence [91] to measure the difference of the two Bernoulli
distributions, but in this dissertation, our own definition can be more intuitive and
specific.

1

1
TPR

TPR

FPR
FPR
0

0
Detectable

Conditionally detectable

Figure 6.7: Range of true-positive and false-positive rates.

6.2.2

Quickest Detection Algorithm

With Remark 6.5, I can use Quickest Detection algorithm to detect the appearance of an
abnormal event with the lowest latency at a given false alarm run length. I will present
both the Bernoulli Generalized Likelihood Ratio Chart and its approximation, the multiple Bernoulli CUSUM Chart, respectively. Compared with the existing nonparametric
solutions, I discretize the continuous probabilistic function space and transform the
problem into a parametric sequential hypothesis testing problem.
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Using Bernoulli Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR) Chart [92] to sequentially detect
abnormal events. I have:

Qk

Rk =

max

0≤τ ≤k−1,β≤T P R≤1

ln

Ik
i=τ +1 T P R (1
Qk
Ik
i=τ +1 F P R (1

− T P R)1−Ik
− F P R)1−Ik

"

T[
P R(1 − F P R)
1 − T[
PR
= max (k − τ ) ln T[
PR ·
+ ln
0≤τ ≤k−1
1 − FPR
F P R(1 − T[
P R)

#

where T[
P R ≈ T P R ∈ [1 − RUF N R , 1) is the estimated true positive rate of zero-bias
abnormality detector and τ is the estimated time when an abnormal event happens.
T[
P R is dynamicaly estimated as follows:

(

"

T[
P R = min B1 , max 1 − RUF N R ,

#)

Pk

i=τ +1

k−τ

Ik

(6.9)

where B1 = 1 − ε is the maximum possible value of T P R and ε is a tiny positive number
to assure T[
P R < 1. An alarm is triggered if Rk > hGLR and hGLR is a pre-defined
threshold. hGLR can be chosen as suggested in: [92]:

hGLR = log10 (ARL · F P R)

(6.10)

where ARL is the average run length between false alarms.
Theoretically, I have to store a long sequence (0 ≤ τ ≤ k − 1) of previous abnormality
detection results to detect an abnormal event. Fortunately, I can use a sliding window
to store relevant data and reduce the computational complexity. In [93] and [92], it is
shown that a GLR chart with a window is asymptotically optimal if the window size m
is sufficiently large.
It is also numerically verifiable that the detection latency of Bernoulli GLR charts can
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be closely approximated with a countable set of Bernoulli CUSUM Charts, where the
identical detection threshold hCU SU M is shared among them and hCU SU M = hGLR
[92, 94]. The approximated range of T P R is covered by each CUSUM chart is:

T P Rmax · i2
T[
P Ri = 1 − RUF N R +
U2

(6.11)

where U is the total number of CUSUM charts, in which greater than 100 is recommended, i denotes the index of each chart. T P Rmax is the max possible value of the
true positive rate that is less than 1. 1 − RUF N R denotes the lower bound of the true
positive rate. Therefore, given an average run length between false alarms, ARL, I have
the worst case average detection delay as:

T̄GLR = T̄CU SU M ∼

hCU SU M
I(P1 , P0 )

(6.12)

Please note that I use the characteristic of multiple Bernoulli CUSUM charts to demonstrate the properties of detection delay.

6.3

Zero-bias Deep Learning for Quickest Identity Spoofing Detection

6.3.1

Introduction

Deep Learning (DL) has reformed the ecosystem of the Internet of Things (IoT). On the
one hand, they have been successfully applied in smart devices for accurate recognition
of complicated inputs [95–97]. On the other hand, deep learning models do not require
high-quality features and reduce the time-consuming feature engineering in conventional
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machine learning schemes [98, 99]. As a representative technology within the scope of
DL, Deep Neural Network (DNN) classifiers aim to use hierarchically stacked convolution
layers to extract latent features to make accurate decisions.
Although DL and DNNs are successful in general purpose applications, applying DNNs
in safety-critical systems requiring assured performance is still controversial. Firstly,
DNNs perform well on known subjects but cannot distinguish unseen abnormal data.
Abnormal signals, such as cyberattacks, are required to identify in real-time with constrained false alarms [100]. Secondly, deep neural networks lack explainability, while
applications in safety-critical systems require making accurate decisions with known
and explainable behaviors. Thirdly, in safety-critical systems, classifiers are supposed
to evolve efficiently within a manageable behavior. The three obstacles impede the deployment of DL and DNNs in IoT of safety-critical systems. Compared with DNNs,
the nearest neighbor matching algorithms naturally overcome these obstacles and gain
popularity in safety-critical systems.
To address the first challenge, existing works use deep Autoencoders or Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) to capture the latent features of the domain-specific inputs by
compressing and accurately reconstructing them. However, training deep autoencoders
or GAN models is even more computationally expensive than training DNN classifiers on
a specific domain. Moreover, autoencoders or GAN models do not guarantee to respond
in time with constrained false alarms [101]. Despite that existing Quickest Detection
(QCD) algorithms can detect changes with minimum latency under constrained false
alarms, they are neither sufficient in handling complicated inputs nor can provide mathematically assured performance when directly combined with Black Box models. For the
second problem, the eXplainable AI (XAI) has been proposed [102]. In this application,
I use the zero-bias neural network to transparentize the decision process and decision
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boundary. Finally, to support dynamic evolving DNN models, I have invented the CSIL
algorithm as in Chapter 5. Therefore, I will focus mainly on the zero-bias deep neural
network enabled quickest detection scheme.

6.3.2

Problem definition

The system model of my proposed framework is depicted in Figure 6.8. I aim to use
a deep learning model to process heterogeneous data from IoT and spot the abnormal
data. I then use the quickest event detection algorithm to detect ongoing abnormal
events with minimum latency.

Time-dependent
activities in IoT
Normal
Heterogeneous
data pipeline

Abnormal
Records
Mixed
Records
records

Records
Records
Records

Deep abnormality detection models w. continual learning

Abnormality
detection

Quickest event
detection

False positive

Detection threshold

True negative

Detection delay

True positive

!!

False negative

Figure 6.8: System model of zero-bias deep learning enabled quick and reliable
abnormality detection in IoT.

In IoT, the system states are highly correlated with time-dependent events, e.g., abnormal events or normal operations. I define that abnormalities are suspicious data caused
by abnormal events. Intuitively, abnormalities could trigger variation of specific indication metrics. Analyzing the drift or variations of these metrics, abnormal events can
be detected sequentially. Therefore, I can convert the real-time abnormality detection
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problem into an online sequential event detection scheme, in which a surveillance oracle
can sequentially collect its target system’s state signals or heterogeneous data denoted
as:

X = {X1 , X2 , . . . Xj . . . Xj+m . . . }

(6.13)

where Xj denotes a state variable or record in vector form, an abnormal event appears
at j and disappear at j + m. Real-time abnormal event detection requires triggering an
alarm before j + m with minimum assured latency.
Well-known methods are provided in the Quickest Change Detection (QCD) theory. For
example, in the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) Control Chart algorithm, a likelihood ratio
test is employed to sequentially process the observed data at each timestamp k, denoted
as:

g(k) = ln(

P1 (Xk )
)
P0 (Xk )

(6.14)

where g(k) is a sufficiency metric, P0 (·), P1 (·) denotes the probabilistic density functions of abnormal and abnormal states, respectively. A constrained cumulative sum of
sufficiency metrics is used as an indicator, denoted as:

S(k) = max(0, S(k − 1) + g(k))

(6.15)

An alarm will be sent once S(k) is greater than a predefined threshold, h. The CUSUM
algorithm has been proved to provide the lowest worst-case detection latency at specific
false alarm intervals. However, CUSUM-style quickest detection algorithms can hardly
handle high-dimension data, where P0 (·) and P1 (·) are difficult to obtain. Even though
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some works use DNNs to derive the sufficiency metric g(k) from high dimension data,
the DNNs’ uncertain responses when encountering abnormalities make performance assurance a theoretic challenge. To enable deep learning for quick and reliable abnormality
detection, the following efforts are needed:

• I need a DNN driven abnormality detection model to process complex data and
provide theoretically assured performance. If possible, the deep abnormality detection model should be derived without a large overhead.
• I need to develop an efficient method to jointly apply performance-assured DNN
and quickest event detection to provide theoretically guaranteed performance in
detecting abnormal events.

6.3.3

Performance Evaluation

In this section, I evaluate the performance of the proposed framework in two folds, I first
use the wireless signal dataset in Section 5.3.2 to test the proposed method for the class
decision boundary and feature vector visualization. Then I use the proposed method
to convert the wireless device recognition DNN into an quickest detection model and
evaluate its performance for identity spoofing detection.
As presented in my prior work [71, 72], I take the first 1024 samples from the signal
of each intercepted message. And convert the 1024 samples into a 32 by 32 by 3 tensor, which incorporate pseudo noise, magnitude-frequency domain, and phase-frequency
domain information, respectively.
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Figure 6.9: Identity spoofing in aviation communication systems.

6.3.3.1

Decision Boundaries in Real-World Zero-Bias DNN

The architecture of my DNN model is depicted in Figure 4.11 with a description of the
dataset in Table 6.1. In Figure 6.10 I use two stacked Voronoi diagrams to depict the
relation of fingerprints, class boundaries, normal and abnormal data, with the DNN
model trained under two scenarios: a) Input signals are polluted by abrupt spike noise
due to the signal interference. b) Input signal without abrupt spikes (removed by a
Gaussian filter).
Table 6.1: Description of dataset

Usage

Description

Training

60% of signals, including 28 aircraft with more than
500 randomly selected raw records for each.

Validation

40% of signals, including 28 aircraft with more than
500 randomly selected raw records for each.

Normal data
Abnormal data

Validation data that’s not been used to train the
network.
Signals including 236 aircraft with less than 200 raw
signal records during the data collection period.

As shown in Figure 6.10a and 6.10b, normal data are closely distributed within their
fingerprints, while abnormalities are sparsely distributed over the feature space. It is
interesting to find that if the DNN model is with high accuracy, the abnormalities are
less likely to appear in normal data clusters. The DNN signal identifier is with high
accuracy within the two scenarios.
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Figure 6.10: Stacked Voronoi diagram of dimension-reduced fingerprints and
validation set two different scenarios. Fingerprints and feature vectors are projected
to a 2D space using t-SNE algorithm [1].

According to Remark 6.3 and 6.4, the abnormality detector’s performance is predictable.
In reality, this single-shot zero-bias abnormality detector trained on noisy data has a
true positive and a true negative rate of 91% and 92%, respectively, which is closely
matched with my prediction. However, the zero-bias abnormality detector trained on
the filtered data has a true positive and a true negative rate of 99% and 91%. The true
negative rate is smaller than the expected value due to the model entering the early
stage of overfitting. At this stage, the training set’s feature vectors can no longer provide
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sufficient information on the distribution of normal data. Therefore, the estimation of
normal data will be misled.
For alleviation, I can set a threshold value for accuracy during training. I derive the cutoff distances, centroids, and covariance matrices at this point. By setting a triggering
value of 96% for the validation accuracy on the filtered data, I get a true-positive rate and
a false-positive rate of 98% and 95%, respectively. The relation between the performance
of the converted abnormality detector and the zero-bias DNN model’s accuracy before
conversion is given in Figure 6.11. As predicted, when the accuracy of zero-bias DNN
gets higher, the normal data occupies a smaller amount of area on the unit hypersphere
surface, and thus produce higher True Positive rates. Meanwhile, lower False Positive
rates are achieved when the zero-bias DNN has higher classification accuracy. According
to Remark 6.5, even when the accuracy is less than 75%, the identity spoofing attack is
still in the sequentially detectable range.

metric

1
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Figure 6.11: Performance of the converted abnormality detector.

6.3.3.2

Quickest Abnormal Event Detection with Zero-Bias DNNs

My model can detect abnormalities (the appearance of an unknown aircraft’s signal) with
almost neglectable latency (less than ten samples on average using GLR chart) as a result
of both high true-positive and true-negative rates. To further evaluate my proposed
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Figure 6.12: Abnormal event detection latencies.

method, I can use numerical simulation results to demonstrate the performance of zerobias DNN, since its response characteristics prior and after abnormal events are modeled
as two Bernoulli distributions in Section 6.2.1. I experiment with a collection of possible
values of hGLR , F P R, and T P R that a zero-bias abnormality detector can encounter.
In which T P R ∈ [0.6, 0.99], F P R ∈ [0, 0.4] and hGLR ∈ [2, 20] The relationship between
abnormal event detection latency and false alarm rate is depicted in Figure 6.12a. I
discover a nice cut-off property, in which the average false alarm rate becomes zero as
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Figure 6.13: Distribution of abnormal event detection latencies.

I select a proper detection threshold hGLR or hCU SU M . After the threshold is properly
set. Once the detection threshold is greater than a certain value, 12 in my experiment,
the detection delay grows linearly as depicted in Figure 6.12b. A further analysis of the
distribution of detection delay with threshold hGLR ∈ [12, 20] is presented in Figure 6.13,
in general, as T P R/F P R gets larger, average detection latency decreases with less
sensitive to hGLR .

6.4

Concluding Remark

In this chapter, I significantly extend the analysis of my previously proposed zero-bias
DNN and combine it with the Quickest Detection algorithms to detect abnormalities and
time-dependent abnormal events in IoT with the lowest assured latency. I first use the
zero-bias neural networks and use Voronoi diagrams to analyze their latent space and derive the region association characteristics. I then provide a solution to convert zero-bias
DNN classifiers, which are easier to obtain, into performance assured binary abnormality detectors with assured performance boundaries. Using the converted abnormality
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detectors, I model their behavior using Bernoulli distribution, which perfectly adapts
to the Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test based Quickest Detection scheme. In this
Quickest Detection scheme, the theoretically assured lowest abnormal event detection
delay is provided with predictable false alarms. Finally, I demonstrate the framework’s
effectiveness using both massive signal records from real-world aviation communication
systems and simulated data.

Chapter 7

Concluding Remark and Future
Work

7.1

Concluding Remark

In this dissertation, I aim to find a solution to seamlessly bridge the two domains:
Quickest Detection and Machine Learning. On the one hand, Quickest Detection has
an advantage for detecting events that cause state change even when there is random
noise, however, Quickest Detection algorithms are not efficient in handling high dimension data and usually require manual and time-consuming feature engineering. On the
other hand, machine learning methods, especially deep learning, are capable of handling heterogeneous data with high dimensions. I finally reach an integral solution with
incremental learning capability, the corresponding findings are as follows:

1. Zero-bias Neural Network: I thoroughly studied the characteristic of the classification layer of deep neural networks. And I invented the zero-bias dense layer for
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zero-bias and equal weight decision. The zero-bias neural network can distinctive
identify the known and unknown classes with a clear boundary. In this dissertation, the zero-bias neural networks provides a very convenient way to analyze the
topological characteristics the latent space of deep neural networks.
2. Topological Maturity and Orthogonal Memory Organization: Based on
the zero-bias neural network, I discover and mathematically prove that neural
networks organize class representation vectors (class fingerprints) in the latent
space with a confusion (interference) minimization manner, in which the class
fingerprints are approximating a mutually orthogonal relation. I then provide a
metric, the degree of conflicts, to quantitative measure the topological maturity of
deep neural networks. This metric provides an important clue for clearly explain
catastrophic forgetting phenomenon during incremental learning.
3. Channel Separation Incremental Learning: Based on the orthogonal memory organization theorem, I invent a new incremental learning algorithm, CSIL,
to facilitate DNNs to evolve incrementally to adapt to operational variation.
4. Integration of Quickest Detection and Deep Neural Network: I use zerobias neural network as an early warning generator for anomalous event detection.
I use the Voronoi diagram to analyse the regional association characteristics of the
latent space of zero-bias neural network. I found that the zero-bias neural classifiers can be transformed into corresponding abnormality detectors with known
performance boundaries. Even better, the response charateristics formulated using
Bernoulli Distributions. In this way, I can integrate parametric quickest detection
with deep neural networks seamlessly and mathematically provide theoretic assurance on performance boundaries.
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Future Works

Unsupervised Deep Learning Driven Quickest Detection Algorithms

In terms of Quickest Detection, my method is a semisupervised learning approach, it is
extremely helpful in developing heuristic cyber defense systems in which a small proportion of prior knowledge about the attack scene is required, and those small proportion
of prior knowledge is useful for constructing the initial topology of the latent space.
However, in some more challenging scenarios, I face the zero-knowledge situation at the
beginning. In these cases, the system needs to employ unsupervised learning algorithms
to automatically explore and build the initial topology. In my plan, I first use the deep
autoencoder with the zero-bias dense layer as the bottleneck layer to explore the existing
normal data space. Then I can use the zero-bias bottlenect layer and the extracted
encoder to form an early warning generator. Such an early warning generator would be
trained incrementally as what I have done in this dissertation. I believe the Converging
Point Theorem (Theorem 5.11) would be a good indicator for us to evaluate whether an
autoencoder maturely trained.

7.2.2

Incremental Learning With Adaptive Network Expansion

In this dissertation, I have used the characteristics of zero-bias neural network and latent
space optimization to uncover the essence of catastrophic forgetting and provide a better
incremental learning algorithm. It should be noted that I have locked the prior layers
as in other works [103–105]. However, locking prior layers could lead to severe problems
when the prior layers are becoming obsolete. Unlocking or expanding the prior layers
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would cause problems when the whole topological characteristics of the latent space will
change and even the fingerprints of old classes have to be adjusted dynamically and
simultaneously. In essence, this will be a bi-level optimization problem. Even though
the deep learning society is eagerly working towards the problem as in [78], incremental
learning with full architecture learning is still very challenging.
In my future work, I will borrow some ideas from the Deep Model Consolidation [78]. I
will initialize two networks with an identical structure and then train the two networks
on different tasks, I will combine the techniques of deep model consolidation and channel
separation incremental learning to develop a more reliable incremental learning strategy.
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